Introduction
As Pakistan’s digital space expands, so does its surveillance by the government. Over the years, the State has strengthened its grip on the digital space, especially when it comes to exercising one’s right of free speech under Article 19 of the Constitution. The country’s expanding digital surveillance apparatus, fuelled by secretive imports of interception systems and broad cyber-laws, is silencing dissent and eroding constitutional safeguards. This surveillance apparatus has often clashed with the exercise of citizens’ fundamental rights, for which it has been repeatedly called out by the international community and international human rights organizations. The State has been accused of deliberately suppressing these freedoms by either exercising executive power to arrest critical speakers or by using firewalls to suppress the critical views. Nonetheless, the Pakistani State has repeatedly used the national security and maintenance of public order imperatives to curtail free speech and access to information.
National security imperatives are not new to the world. In almost all authoritative regimes, critical narrative is suppressed under the cover of national security, in a State like Pakistan, where there is quasi-democracy, such actions confront the executive’s role in upholding human rights. While it is also important to recognize that due to digitalization, a rapid increase in hate speech and anti-State narratives have been disrupting public order, nonetheless, it is pertinent to balance the suppression of free speech and the right to information with people’s exercise of such rights. As noted by Justice Athar Minallah in Shahid Akbar Abbasi vs The Chief Commissioner, Islamabad (2021) that suppression of ‘free speech leads to a regressive societies’ which ‘inevitably results in chaos and anarchy.’[1] Protecting free speech is essential for any State especially a State like Pakistan which has historically been criticized and has also admitted of sponsoring terrorism.[2]
PECA and Free Speech
The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) 2016[3] and use of internet firewalls to regulate media, especially the cyberspace, has come under scrutiny by international and national human rights organizations. The Act may be intended for the right purposes or may be a need of the hour for a country that faces terrorism and extremism, the broad scope of the Act raises alarms. Since the enactment of the Act, several cases of it being used to suppress political dissent and social activism have been reported. In January 2026, prominent human rights lawyer and activist Imaan Mazari, along with her husband, was sentenced to a combined 17 years each under the PECA in a case related to tweets targeting government policies.[4] Various international bodies and human rights organizations, including the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), strongly condemned the conviction.[5] The Acts’ broad and ambiguous language has been met with criticism that it disproportionately curtails freedom of speech that results in undermining of democratic principles and constitutional values. While acknowledging that national security cannot be sidestepped, we must ensure that it must not violate free speech, as it is essential for democratic accountability.
Dissecting the PECA in relation to free speech and national security, a nuanced approach must be taken. The Act provides for enforcement agencies with a legal standing to track and penalise individuals or groups engaged in activities that are deemed a threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty.[6] This security-driven approach is challenged by critics for its implications on civil liberties and free speech. They argue that lack of clear language can lead to misuse of the Act where national security imperative is invoked to suppress dissenting political views.[7] In this regard, Islamabad High Court’s judgement in Shoukat Ali vs. Government of Pakistan, whereby the Court elaborated the rationale behind free speech and the importance of dissent in a society, particularly in the context of national security imperative, is of importance.[8] The court held,
‘The rationale for free speech is at least threefold. One, human beings have agency and can distinguish between truth and falsehood. Two, in a marketplace of ideas where all sorts of desirable and undesirable ideas are available, truth will eventually drive out falsity. And three, the standards for enforcing fundamental rights to equality, dignity and liberty evolve over time. As dissenters challenge existing ideas, social consciousness grows, the condition of human existence and rights improve and society progresses.
Thus, it is in society’s collective interest that the right to dissent be upheld, even though critical ideas might seem unpalatable. It is therefore in the State’s own interest to tolerate ideas critical of it. Criticism of the State and its policies is a natural outcome of the democratic system of governance and does not produce a national security predicament. National security is a meaningful concept and must not be bandied about in a trivial manner or used as a prop to defeat fundamental rights of citizens, including the right to free speech and information. Further, the security of the State must not be projected by the State itself to be so fragile that critical speech or a level-playing field for the media would shake its foundation.’[9]
Furthermore, the Acts’ language is strongly criticized for being ambiguous and vague which causes difficulty in deciphering the true meaning of the Act, especially in the context criminal conduct. For example, in the definitions section certain words are defined very subjectively, such as the word ‘act’ has been defined under the statute as ‘a series of acts’ without elaborating as to what constitutes an ‘act’ under the said provision.[10] Moreover, section 10 deals with cyber-terrorism a crucial concept of the act, however defines it broadly, which is criticized for including advancement of ‘inter-faith, sectarian or ethnic hate’ as a qualifier for cyber-terrorism (per s.10(b)). Instead, cyber-terrorism offences must be clearly linked to ‘violence and the risk of harm and injury’, as many critics believe, thereby confusing terrorism with offences of incitement of violence and hatred.[11]
Adding to this, the Act is said to be enacted for curtailing free speech, especially in the context of dissent of government policies. Section 26 of the Act criminalizes ‘spoofing’ which is normally considered to be ordinary political satire acknowledged in every society.[12] Section 31 does away with the requirement of a warrant for gaining access to individual’s data if deemed necessary be investigating officer, while section 32 grants PTA the power to retain data about individuals from service providers for a period of up to 1 year.[13] Additionally, section 42 allows government to share any data with international governments under the pretext of cooperation against cybercrimes.[14] Section 33 empowers Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to access digital device that may be required for purpose of investigation of any crime of offence under the act.[15] Thus, indicating that the Act empowers to government to infringe citizens’ right to free speech and privacy by delegating them powers with few judicial scrutiny and due process. Critics believe these enactments enable illegal access of citizens’ data and broadened powers to clamp down on political opponents and social activists.
As per International Covenant Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guidelines pertaining to free speech, national security imperative has been placed under limitations that the limitation of free speech should be appropriate, essential, and directed towards the accomplishment of a justifiable goal.[16] The main problem with PECA is its absence of a proportionality and necessity framework as specified in international norms like the ICCPR.[17] Thereby giving the enforcement agenices extensive authority without adequate guidelines to use of force against political dissent and social activism.
Digital Surveillance Mechanisms in Pakistan
Apart from the PECA, internet firewalls provide added authority to the State to surveil and censor political dissent and critique of the government policies. Pakistan has, over the years, obtained from foreign companies, through a covert global supply chain of sophisticated surveillance and censorship tools, particularly the Web Monitoring System (WMS 2.0) and the Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS).[18] Amnesty International’s General Secretary said, ‘Pakistan’s Web Monitoring System and Lawful Intercept Management System operate like watchtowers, constantly snooping on the lives of ordinary citizens.’[19]
The LIMS mandated by Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) is installed across telecommunication networks throughout the country allowing government agencies, especially intelligence agencies, to tap into and access consumer data.[20] This data is in turn used to clampdown on civilians. Critics have accused government of misusing these firewalls to censor critiques of their policies and crackdown on political opponents. However, government repeatedly backs its decision to install and operate firewalls in the name of national security. The concept so misused in the country that it has become difficult to differentiate between what actually falls under it and what does not.
Amnesty International’s report ‘Shadows of Control’, expands upon the concept of national security in Pakistan in light of these firewalls. Section 54 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organisation) Act 1996 grants broad powers to the federal government to authorize ‘any person’ ‘to intercept calls and messages or to trace calls… in the interest of national security.’[21] The act, however, does not provide any definition for national security, nor does it make the powers the federal government subject to judicial oversight. Additionally, Section 5(1)(b) of the Telegraph Act 1885, a colonial-era law is also cited by the authorities to authorise the federal and provincial governments to intercept messages under instances of ‘public emergency, or, in the interest of the public safety’.[22] This demonstrates that the governments approach towards censorship and surveillance is extensive thereby allowing them to use law as a tool to spy on citizens and repress basic human rights such as freedom of expression and privacy rights.
Limited judicial oversight eases the way for the State to use its extensive powers without significant intervention. The Fair Trial Act of 2013 as part of a series of acts provides some judicial scrutiny in cases of interception and surveillance, as noted by Amnesty International. In spite of that, the act allows ‘secret warrants’ to be issued by judges ‘in chamber’ rather than in open courts;[23] contradicting the basic concept of fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan. Again, posing the question that how to curtail executives’ misuse of power over citizens privacy and information rights.
Conclusion
Though misuse of the national security imperative is almost ordinary, many argue some sort of limitation is necessary in light of the country’s geographic location and the ongoing wave of insurgency post-9/11. Over the years, Pakistan has been on the front lines in the war against terror which has increased the number of terror activities in the country, especially ones fuelled in the name of Islam. This vulnerability to terrorism and extremism necessitates the State to take actions to counter terrorism and extremism and one of the most effective ways for intelligence in the digital era is by using firewalls and other such methods which are in turn protected by legislations. Despite this, it is the duty of the State to protect the basic human rights of its citizens while also keeping a check on the radical elements of the society as free speech and rightful critique of government policies are essential in strengthening of the national security as noted in Shahid Akbar Abbasi cases.[24] For this, a balance needs to be struck whereby the State can ensure that no innocent is falsely accused or tried in the name of national security. This can only happen when the State is willing to welcome critical thought and is open to reforms of its policies. Further, this can be advanced with transparent judicial system of checks and balances on the executives’ powers under the Act and using the national security imperative proportionally as set out in international law. At present, there is no indication that the State is willing to welcome any such reforms to policies which makes it tough for ensuring human rights.
Pakistani State has a history of using cultural, religious and national security reasons to justify its ignorance of human rights. While these reasons may be rational in some cases, their extensive use by the State authorities have made them controversial which has raised the question of the nature of the States’ use of its power. Unless a balance is struck or a mechanism is developed that ensures justice and fairness, these questions will again and again be raised, putting the very nature of the Pakistani States’ operation. George Washington rightly stated that ‘if freedom of speech is taken away, then dumb and silent we will be led, like sheep to the slaughter.’[25]
Bibliography
- ‘Pakistan: Arbitrary Arrest and Sentencing of Human Rights Lawyers Imaan Zainab Mazari-Hazir and Hadi Ali Chattha | ICJ’ (International Commission of Jurists, 29 January 2026) <www.icj.org/pakistan-arbitrary-arrest-and-sentencing-of-human-rights-lawyers-imaan-zainab-mazari-hazir-and-hadi-ali-chattha/> accessed 6 February 2026
- Shah SKA, ‘A Critical Analysis of Efficacy of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016: Irritants and Remedies’ (2024) 45 Journal of Pakistan Administration 66
- Aqdas T, ‘Digital Governance or Political Control: Media Censorship and Free Speech under PECA in Pakistan’ (Nust.edu.pk2026) <https://icbmass.nust.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/full-paper-Tamseel-Aqdas.docx> accessed 7 February 2026
- Khan EA, ‘The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016: An Analysis’ (Shaikh Ahmed Hassan School of Law, LUMS) <https://sahsol.lums.edu.pk/node/12862> accessed 7 February 2026
- ‘Pakistan: Mass Surveillance and Censorship Machine Is Fueled by Chinese, European, Emirati and North American Companies’ (Amnesty International) <www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/09/pakistan-mass-surveillance-and-censorship-machine-is-fueled-by-chinese-european-emirati-and-north-american-companies/> accessed 7 February 2026
- ‘Shadows of Control Censorship and Mass Surveillance in Pakistan’ (Amnesty International, September 2025) <www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ASA3302062025ENGLISH.pdf> accessed 7 February 2026
- ‘’We’ve Been Doing This Dirty Work For…’: Pak Defence Min Admits to Funding, Training Terrorists’ (Firstpost) <www.firstpost.com/world/pahalgam-terror-attack-pakistan-defence-minister-funding-training-terrorists-khwaja-asif-13882955.html> accessed 11 February 2026
[1] Shahid Akbar Abbasi, Advocate vs The Chief Commissioner, Islamabad (PLD 2021 Islamabad 1).
[2] ‘’We’ve Been Doing This Dirty Work For…’: Pak Defence Min Admits to Funding, Training Terrorists’ (Firstpost) <www.firstpost.com/world/pahalgam-terror-attack-pakistan-defence-minister-funding-training-terrorists-khwaja-asif-13882955.html> accessed 11 February 2026.
[3] The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, ACT NO. XL OF 2016, 18th August, 2016.
[4] ‘Pakistan: Arbitrary Arrest and Sentencing of Human Rights Lawyers Imaan Zainab Mazari-Hazir and Hadi Ali Chattha | ICJ’ (International Commission of Jurists, 29 January 2026) <www.icj.org/pakistan-arbitrary-arrest-and-sentencing-of-human-rights-lawyers-imaan-zainab-mazari-hazir-and-hadi-ali-chattha/> accessed 6 February 2026.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Tamseel Aqdas , ‘Digital Governance or Political Control: Media Censorship and Free Speech under PECA in Pakistan’ (Nust.edu.pk2026) <https://icbmass.nust.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/full-paper-Tamseel-Aqdas.docx> accessed 7 February 2026.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Shoukat Ali v Government of Pakistan (PLD 2024 Islamabad 135).
[9] Ibid.
[10] Eesha Arshad Khan, ‘The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016: An Analysis’ (Shaikh Ahmed Hassan School of Law, LUMS) <https://sahsol.lums.edu.pk/node/12862> accessed 7 February 2026.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Syed Khizar Ali Shah, ‘A Critical Analysis of Efficacy of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016: Irritants and Remedies’ (2024) 45 Journal of Pakistan Administration 66, 74.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid 75.
[16] Supra note 6.
[17] Ibid.
[18] ‘Pakistan: Mass Surveillance and Censorship Machine Is Fueled by Chinese, European, Emirati and North American Companies’ (Amnesty International) <www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/09/pakistan-mass-surveillance-and-censorship-machine-is-fueled-by-chinese-european-emirati-and-north-american-companies/> accessed 7 February 2026.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] ‘Shadows of Control Censorship and Mass Surveillance in Pakistan’ (Amnesty International, September 2025), 19 <www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/ASA3302062025ENGLISH.pdf> accessed 7 February 2026.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Supra Note 1.
[25] Ibid.
