False Promise of Marriage and the Limits of Rape Law in Pakistan

Abstract

The Pakistani criminal law assigns a central role to the lack of consent defining the idea of rape as a component of Section 375 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), 1860. There is however recurring legal issue in which the act of sexual intercourse is done with the consent of the adult woman who is purportedly brought on board by promise of marriage which is not realized. The use of such consent has been challenged by the Pakistani courts on several occasions on whether such consent is vitiated under Section 90 PPC as consent made under a misconception of fact. Courts have shown a steady trend in this area: when a sui juris woman expressly agrees to sexual intercourse, even under the guise of a promise of marriage, the act does not qualify as rape, but can be considered willful fornication under Section 496-B PPC. This paper is an investigation into the legal backdrop and the highest judicial officials in order to contend that the Pakistan courts are correct in the differentiation between rape and consensual sex emerging as a result of failed love-related commitments and hence the continuity of the dogma of rape, as a crime based upon coercion and lack of consent.

Introduction

One of the most important conceptual lines in criminal law is what differentiates rape and consensual sexual relations. Rape claims are common in Pakistan in situations where a romantic affair is interrupted by sexual intercourse, which is said to be forced by a promise of marriage that is not fulfilled. Complainants usually want to define such behavior as rape according to Section 375. Nevertheless, Pakistani courts have continually underlined the fundamental aspect of rape as the lack of consent, and not the later violation of a personal pledge or moral duty. The legal nature of sexual intercourse between a man and a woman is fundamentally different when the sex occurs with the mutual agreement of the adult woman. Instead of amounting to rape, this kind of behavior can be considered as fornication as defined under Section 496-B PPC as long as the act was committed willingly by both parties. This is their doctrinal difference, which has strong legal consequences, as rape in Section 376 PPC is non-bailable and a serious crime, and fornication in Section 496 -B PPC is bailable and liable to relatively less punishment. The Pakistani courts have consequently come up with a prudent jurisprudence in order to avoid misjudging consensual relations as rape.

Legal Frameworks of Sexual Offenses

The legal framework of sexual acts in the Pakistani Penal Code, 1860, provides a clear conceptual difference between rape and consensual sex. Section 375 is the one that gives the basic meaning of rape and the conditions under which sexual intercourse is criminal. In this provision, rape is committed when penetration of a sexual nature is done under certain circumstances, whereby the consent of the victim is either missing or inadmissible by law. The statute lists some of such situations which may arise, such as those involving the commission of the act;

  • against the will of the victim,
  • without the victim’s consent,
  • with consent obtained through fear of death or hurt,
  • with consent obtained by impersonating the victim’s husband,
  • when the victim is under sixteen years of age, or
  • when the victim is incapable of communicating consent.

The section is structured, and language-wise, the offense of rape is essentially based on the lack of voluntary consent. Rape is thus being dealt with by the law as a severe outrage of bodily autonomy involving coercion, exploitation, or incapacity as opposed to the fact of the existence of sexual relations outside marriage. Shopping hand in hand with the idea of consent in criminal law is Section 90 of the Pakistan Penal Code, which addresses cases in which consent is deemed legally invalid because it is obtained through fear or a misconception. The provision provides that consent is not valid as required under the Penal Code when it is given under fear of harm or by a misrepresentation of fact, even if the party who acts on it is aware or believes that the consent was given under such fear or misrepresentation. Theoretically, this section can be used in a case where the core of the consent was based on deception. The Pakistani courts have, however, tended to take this provision with caution, especially when it comes to dealing with cases involving consent to sexual intercourse on the promise of marriage. The court standard has demanded evidential proof that the agreement of the complainant was solely caused by a certain misconception purposely formed by the criminal. The courts have thus been adamant about equating the simple failure to fulfill a promise of marriage as a misconception of the nature as contemplated by Section 90 PPC. The general judicial logic is that when an adult woman voluntarily engages in a romantic contact and makes an agreement to engage in sexual intercourse, the consequent non-performance of a promise to marry will not necessarily rescind the prior consent. The statutory scheme also acknowledges the consensual relationships outside marriage as an independent offense by means of Section 496-B PPC that concerns the offense of fornication. This is an addition that explains that when a man and a woman willingly involve themselves in sexual intercourse, they commit fornication even though they are not married to one another. The punishment (imprisonment) prescribed by the law is up to five years, with a fine of up to ten thousand rupees. The fact that it exists shows that the legislature has dealt with consensual sexual relations between non-married adults as a different and less serious crime than rape. Fornication, in contrast to rape, which assumes the lack of consent and is considered a serious offense against personal autonomy, is based on the willingness of both sides. In addition, procedural implications that are attached to the crime further emphasize this difference, where fornication is generally defined as a bailable crime and is more likely not to attract the same punishment as rape under Section 376 PPC. The legal framework thus sets the limits of the law: coercion or lack of consent makes it rape, but consensual sex between unmarried people, regardless of whether it is socially or morally accepted, is fornication, but not rape.

The Doctrine developed by the Judiciary

Judicial courts in Pakistan have gradually evolved a consistent jurisprudence to differentiate rape and consensual sex relations under the promise of marriage. One of the foremost experts of this kind is Muhammad Saleem v. State[1], the Lahore High Court was faced with the issue whether sexual intercourse supposedly taking place on a pretext of promise of marriage may be a rape under the Pakistan Penal Code, Section 375. Having reviewed the evidence and the evidence presented, the Court concluded that the complainant was voluntarily involved in the relationship and that no evidence of force or allegation of no consent was found. As a result, the Court was of the view that the factual circumstances did not put the case under the umbrella of rape that falls under Section 376 PPC. Instead, the Court noticed that the circumstances pointed to an offense of fornication. The Court made it clear that it was not a rape as referred to by section 375 PPC, of which section 376 PPC is punishable; it is quite clear that it is a case of fornication. Such a ruling upholds the fact that consensual sexual intercourse between two adults cannot be retrospectively turned into rape simply because the promise of marriage was not honored.

The Lahore High Court previously expressed a similar position in the doctrine in Nazima Shahzadi v. SHO Police Station Pindi Gheb[2]. At that, the Court defined the legal standard to satisfy which rape under Section 375 PPC will occur. It pointed out the fact that in the event of sexual intercourse with the consent of the woman, the central component of rape, which is the lack of consent, is incomplete. The Court has indicated categorically that when a man engages in sexual intercourse with any woman at their consent, it does not constitute rape, but at best, the act may be considered a form of fornication. The argument highlights the ideological basis of the Pakistani rape legislation, where consent is the determining element in determining criminal culpability. The ruling indicates the judicial system has always held the position that consensual sex between adults, although ethically dubious, cannot be turned into the serious crime of rape. This approach can be elaborated further by the courts, as in the case of Zahid v. State[3], where the Lahore High Court granted bail to the accused based on the medical and forensic evidence. The medico-legal examination showed that there were no signs of violence on the body of the complainant, nor were there any signs of resistance. Also, the commission of rape was not verified by the forensic report. Under these conditions, the Court concluded that the issue of whether the alleged acts fell within the jurisdiction of rape under Section 376 PPC or rather it amounted to fornication under Section 496-B PPC had to be decided at trial. The Court thus handled it as an issue of inquiry. This argument symbolizes the judicial reserve in the suits of consensual liaisons with the fact that the charges of rape are not supposed to be taken literally when the other circumstances and elements of the case indicate that the complainant is participating in the relations voluntarily. The Sindh Court also took a comparable view on Fayyaz v. The State[4]. In such a scenario, the claims were as a result of a familiarity and friendship relationship between the two parties. As was observed by the Court, the complainant had not made any complaint of any aspect of coercion, the fear of getting injured or being harassed. Rather, the supposed sexual affair was seen to be a consequence of a consensual relationship between them. Based on these facts, the Court opined that further investigation was necessary in the context of the issue as stipulated in Section 497 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly the accused was bonded on post-arrest bail. The ruling demonstrates how the Pakistani courts consider the accusations based on the consensual relationship with care, in line with which the harsh criminal penalties that relate to rape are to be avoided where the factual frameworks lead to the voluntary intimacy. It was further explained by the Lahore High Court that rape and consensual sexual relations could not be conceptually similar in Zain Tariq v. The State[5]. The Court in the case made the clear articulation that rape is essentially a non-consensual act that is based on violence, coercion, and domination wherein the rapist ignores the autonomy and bodily integrity of the victim. In contrast, the Court stated that fornication is consensual sexual contacts between persons who are not married to one another. The expression by the Court supports the doctrinal distinction between the two crimes according to Pakistani criminal law. The decision reinforces the judicial system which focuses on consent as the key factor that guides the assessment of the real cases of sexual assault and consensual relations, which later go sour or lead to conflicts. Combined, these rulings indicate a general and steady judicial philosophy in the Pakistani jurisprudence. Courts have over and over again affirmed that the defining factor of rape under Section 375 PPC is the lack of consent and when an adult woman participates in sexual intercourse voluntarily, the crime cannot be ordinarily a rape based on the fact that the relationship between the two had a promise of marriage that has been broken. Rather, this behavior can be considered a fornication offense under Section 496-B PPC, which is a minor and punishable by a fine. This jurisprudence is the guarantee that the law on rape is kept within the frames of Coercion and sexual violence while avoiding the abuse of the same in cases of disagreement in the relationships based on consent.

Bail Jurisprudence and The Principle of Further Inquiry

The definition of sexual relations as rape or fornication has important procedural consequences during the bail level. Under the present law, the rape under Section 376 PPC falls under the prohibitory clause of the law under Section 497 Cr.P.C., so in the case of rape the courts are not eager to allow bail when the crime is evident. Where however the evidence available points to the possibility of a consensual relationship, the courts often rely on Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. that permits bail in cases where the case where a relationship might have existed needs to be inquired into. In this case, courts are aware that the issue could finally be subject to the 496-B PPC and not Section 376 PPC. This strategy indicates the courts attempt to ensure rape claims are not infringed in a dispute that has been caused by a failed relationship without necessarily ensuring that the specific nature of the offense is established by the court of law.

Rationales of the Jurisprudence Doctrine

The Pakistani courts have some key principles when they distinguish rape and consensual relations with promise of marriage. To begin with, the law identifies sui juris woman autonomy. A woman in her adulthood is placed in the position of making free decisions concerning personal relations and sexuality. Second, breach of promise does not necessarily nullify consent. Broken vow of marriage can have a moral implication but not make consensual sex a rape. Third, the judicial system attempts to maintain the gravity of rape as a crime of violence and intimidation, and its harsh criminal elements are not to be applied to those instances when rape is the stereotypical example. Fourth, there is always the concern among courts that the rape laws may be abused in the situations where the consensual relationships might degenerate over time.

Conclusion

Pakistani jurisprudence has come up with a cohesive doctrine of drawing the line between rape and consensual sexual intercourse with a promise of marriage. It all depends on the consent or the lack of it. In the situation where the adult woman freely consents to take part in sexual intercourse, and the promise of marriage is later breached by the accused, the failure does not necessarily make the activity rape according to Section 375 PPC. Rather, such behavior can be included in the fornication offense that is covered by Section 496-B PPC, which is a minor and bailable offense. This jurisprudence will provide that the criminal law contains a principled distinction between sexual violence and consensual relationships, which safeguards the integrity of rape statutes as well as the rights of those involved in voluntary relations.


[1] 2023 LHC 6139

[2] 2009 PCrLJ 751

[3] 2018 YLRN 220

[4] 2016 SBLR 1442

[5] 2024 LHC 6099


Daniyal Shoukat

Author: Daniyal Shoukat

Rana Daniyal Shoukat, Advocate is a legal professional and researcher specializing in international law, dispute resolution, human rights, and legal innovation. He is the Founder and Partner of Wakalat Online LLP, currently heading Content and Development, where he manages strategic content and legal programs. A proud alumnus of the International Institute for Strategic Research, Georgia, Daniyal also holds leadership roles as Associate at Young Mediator Forum Pvt. Ltd. and Secretary General of the Human Rights Program—a joint initiative between Legal Research & Analysis (India) and Wakalat Online LLP. His expertise covers mediation, arbitration, international humanitarian law, and legal technology, shown through his work leading webinars and as a Legal Correspondent at Legal Research & Analysis (India). He has interned at Sherwani Law Chamber (Pakistan) and Legal Research & Analysis (India), focusing on cross-border legal research. Daniyal has authored numerous Scholarly Research Papers published in various legal, social sciences, and intellectual property research journals, covering topics like mediation in civil and commercial disputes, AI in mediation and arbitration, financial crimes mediation, the conceptual framework of international arbitration, the use of AI in international arbitration Proceedings, and WIPO’s dispute resolution for domain name disputes.

Author: Saba Noor

Saba Noor, Advocate, practices criminal law before the Magisterial and Sessions Courts of Jhelum and Sarai Alamgir.

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