Abstract
Honour killings in Pakistan represent a persistent form of gender-based violence that existing legislation has failed to adequately address. This paper critically analyses the Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offences in the Name or Pretext of Honour) Act 2016 (CLA 2016) and argues that it fails on two fundamental levels. First, the Act provides no statutory definition of honour killing, leaving the determination entirely to judicial discretion; a discretion Pakistani courts have exercised inconsistently and regressively. Second, even where an honour-based motive is established, convictions are impeded by an evidentiary framework ill-suited to the realities of these crimes.
Drawing on comparative analysis, this paper proposes two substantive reforms. The first is a clear statutory definition of honour killing, codifying the relational nexus between perpetrator and victim, elevating honour-based motive to an aggravating element, and expressly barring the defence of grave and sudden provocation. The second is a formal statutory rebalancing of the evidentiary burden within the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, modelled on Sections 117 and 118 of India’s Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023, shifting the evidential burden to the accused once the prosecution establishes a prima facie case through circumstantial evidence. Together, these reforms aim to transform the CLA 2016 into a coherent, enforceable statute proportionate to the lived realities of honour killings in Pakistan.
Keywords: Honour killing; Pakistan Penal Code; Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2016; Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2004; judicial discretion; burden of proof; Qanun-e-Shahadat Order; gender-based violence.
Defining Characteristics of Honour Killing and Its Constituent Elements
1.1. Introduction
In the absence of a distinct statutory definition for “honour killing”, the statutes of various countries attempt to fill the gaps necessitated for convictions and remedial procedures under the already established general penal provisions relevant to homicide, creating a profound and complex challenge within criminal jurisprudence.
Legal frameworks have attempted to prosecute honour-based violence under standard homicide statutes. However, these standard laws are designed to address individual, isolated acts of violence. Honour killings, conversely, are fundamentally different; they are collective in their motive, for example, they are committed by an individual or group of individuals to defend or protect the honour of a family or community and are deeply rooted in patriarchal structures and communal codes of conduct.[1] Therefore, relying on general homicide provisions creates a statutory vacuum that perpetrators frequently exploit to evade proportionate criminal responsibility.[2] In Pakistan, this statutory vacuum is also supplemented by deeply entrenched socio-cultural norms that are deeply rooted in patriarchy. The absence of a standalone legislative definition, therefore, enables perpetrators to exploit general penal provisions, while cultural acceptance further hinders accountability.
To formulate an effective and impermeable legal framework, it is essential to establish a baseline definition of what precisely constitutes honour killing. This requires an in-depth deconstruction of the crime into its constituent legal elements: the relational nexus between the victim and perpetrator (actus reus circumstances), the specific criminal intent and driving motive (mens rea), and the exclusion of affirmative defences such as provocation and loss of self-control.
International instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women impose obligations on signatory states to penalise honour-based violence. However, they do not provide a constituent-level baseline definition for honour killing. Therefore, this chapter does not rely upon international law but instead derives a constituent-level baseline definition from comparative domestic statutory models.
This chapter, therefore, in this context, critically analyses a spectrum of statutory models—ranging from the progressive frameworks of the United Kingdom and Turkey to the highly regressive provisions of the Jordanian Penal Code. The selection of these three jurisdictions is not arbitrary. The United Kingdom represents a progressive common law model that has successfully utilised the relational nexus through specific statutory law; Turkey provides a civil law example that has elevated cultural motive to a statutory aggravating element; and Jordan illustrates a regressive model whose provocation-based leniency provisions directly mirror the legislative failures evident in Pakistan’s own penal code. This comparative framework allows for a structured critique of Pakistan’s legislation and serves as the standard for evaluating the efficacy of Pakistan’s legislation on the subject matter of honour killing.
1.2. Distinguishing Honour Killing from Other Forms of Homicide: The Relational Nexus
A primary and indispensable requirement for defining honour killing is to distinguish it from other forms of homicide and domestic abuse through the existence of a separate statute. Ordinarily, domestic violence often revolves around intimate partner dynamics. Honour killings, however, are unique in the context that they are to a greater extent perpetrated by a broader group of familial relatives[3]. Therefore, statutorily an effective legal definition is required that explicitly identifies and subsequently codifies the specific communal and familial nexus between the perpetrator and the victim.
The United Kingdom’s law provides an effective and robust legal framework for recognising the unique sociological dynamics of honour crimes, particularly honour killing, through the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 and its accompanying statutory guidance. The statutory guidance defines ‘honour’-based abuse as “a crime or incident committed to protect or defend the perceived honour of the family and/or community, or in response to individuals trying to break away from constraining ‘norms’ of behaviour that their family or community is trying to impose.”[4] It explicitly notes that abuse may be carried out under the guise of protecting or upholding the ‘honour’ of a person, family, or community in response to alleged or perceived violations of their code of behaviour.[5]
Crucially, the UK legislation identifies that while ‘honour’-based abuse can occur in various contexts, it is predominantly carried out by immediate or extended family members[6]. Since, under the ambit of this paper, we intend to legislate upon a particular type of honour killing, one committed by family in the privacy of households, it is imperative to rule out the crime committed in other various contexts. To legally operationalise this distinction, the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 requires that the perpetrator and the victim be “personally connected”.[7] The definition of “personally connected” within the Act makes a direct reference to the Family Law Act 1996.[8] Under section 63 of the Act, the term “relative” is meticulously and broadly defined. It encompasses not only direct lineage such as the father, mother, son, daughter, grandmother, grandfather, grandson, or granddaughter, but it explicitly captures the extended familial network by including the brother, sister, uncle, aunt, niece, nephew, or first cousin. Furthermore, the statutory guidance clarifies that honour-based abuse may also be perpetrated by extended families, including in-laws.[9]
The inclusion of extended family and in-laws is a vital constituent element for a baseline definition. It acknowledges the reality that honour killings are often collaborative crimes, in which multiple relatives may be complicit or actively participate to restore perceived communal shame.[10] The guidance further acknowledges that while this form of abuse can affect anyone, it is particularly associated with insular communities where notions of ‘honour’ and ‘shame’ hold significant cultural weight.[11] Moreover, it stems from the traditional notions of gender roles and patriarchy and therefore greatly impacts females in its wake but may also include male victims.[12]
Furthermore, establishing a best-practice definition requires acknowledging the precise nature of the actus reus. The UK framework establishes that abusive behaviour in these scenarios is fundamentally intentional. Perpetrators may use a variety of tactics against their victims, which can include restrictions to their freedom, isolation, physical abuse, and death threats.[13] Because these actions are deliberate and sustained, any element of surprise or provocation claimed by the perpetrator should not mitigate the intentionality of the final homicidal act but must only be treated as an aggravating factor. By codifying the requirement of a “personal connection” across an expansive familial network, the UK law creates a distinct, unavoidable categorisation for these crimes, isolating them from general homicide.
1.3. Mens Rea and Motive in Honour-Related Killings
Beyond the relational nexus, the second constituent element required to effectively criminalise honour killings is the accurate categorisation of the mens rea (criminal intent) and the underlying motive of the crime. In legal systems where statutes lack specific language regarding the motive of “honour”, immense judicial ambiguity arises.[14] Courts frequently struggle to determine whether the intentional killing was a meticulously premeditated murder or if it was triggered by a sudden impulse or surprise. This ambiguity allows for manipulation of the narrative, framing honour killings as crimes of sudden passion to secure lesser sentences.[15]
However, what is neglected or has been continuously subject to error is that both honour killings and the crimes of sudden passion are reflective of the same gendered intent/ rationale which directly stems from the loss to masculine honour or masculine dishonour.[16]
To construct a watertight legal definition, the statutory law must bridge the gap between intent and motive. The Turkish Penal Code provides an exemplary, precise statutory mechanism for addressing such specific ambiguity[17]. While many jurisdictions treat motive merely as an evidentiary tool to prove intent, it can be contended that the Turkish law elevates the specific motive of an honour crime to a statutory element of an aggravated offence. Article 82(1) of the Turkish Penal Code explicitly outlines the parameters and conditions for the act of intentional killing. Most significantly, Article 82(1)(k) categorises intentional killing committed “with the motive of tradition” as an aggravated act. Since honour killing stems from traditional notions that a male’s honour is dependent upon female virtuous behaviour (and not vice versa), whose zealous protection is paramount even at the expense of gender-based violence such as honour killing,[18] it is essential to effectively legislate in a way which caters to the traditional patriarchal norms persistent in honour killings to prevent loopholes. The Turkish legislature, for instance, successfully addresses the core jurisprudential dilemma by statutorily recognising “motive of tradition”. It eliminates the legal necessity to bifurcate the crime into premeditated murder versus murder committed on the spur of provocation since both suffer from the same disease of gender subordination, redemption of the woman’s male relatives honour[19] , which is fixated on the provision of the woman’s virtuous character.
Under this framework, if the underlying catalyst for the murder is rooted in the enforcement of tradition or the restoration of perceived honour, the requisite standard for the aggravated crime is definitively met. It renders the temporal nature of the intent—whether the killer plotted the murder for weeks or acted mere minutes after a perceived transgression—legally irrelevant to the severity of the charge. The motive itself dictates the aggravated nature of the crime. Incorporating such specific motivational language into a penal code is a critical constituent element for a best-practice definition, as it legally binds the cultural driver of the crime to the highest punitive consequences.
Such legislation will effectively pre-empt courts from accepting defences of traditional values in cases of honour killing, where females are killed by male relatives for reasons of alleged affair or infidelity, such that the legislation entails a motive to be accommodating of a man’s traditional values which stems from loss of masculine honour.[20]
1.4. The Defence of Grave and Sudden Provocation
Lastly, the most contentious constituent element of honour killing is the provision of affirmative defences, specifically the defence of grave and sudden provocation and loss of self-control, which either absolves criminal responsibility or acts as a highly effective mitigating circumstance.
Honour killings are most often linked with allegations of moral or sexual transgressions against the victim.[21] Consequently, perpetrators consistently invoke provocation to mitigate their culpability, arguing that the victim’s actions induced a sudden loss of self-control.[22] Constructing a baseline definition requires analysing how legislation can strictly prohibit such defences to ensure absolute criminal responsibility as well as to prohibit this violence through mitigating excuses.
The Jordanian Penal Code illustrates a highly problematic and regressive approach that offers statutory leniency for perpetrators, effectively allowing the instrumentalisation of the concept of provocation against victims of honour-based violence.[23] Article 340 provides a reduced sentence to the perpetrator for murder, injury, or harm if he discovers his female relatives, including his wife, with another man in an illegitimate relationship.[24] Additionally, this leniency is compounded by Article 98 which reduces the sentence of a perpetrator who commits a crime in response to a serious and wrongful act on the part of the victim in a fit of fury.
The jurisprudential mechanics of the aforementioned Jordanian provisions are deeply flawed. According to the law, to benefit from these exemptions or reductions, the killer must have been “surprised” by the act, creating an exception to honour killings by restricting its application to pre-meditated murder only.[25] This means he can benefit from leniency in law if he didn’t know beforehand that the victim was committing adultery but still acted with the requisite intent/ motive of restoring perceived male honour by avenging the female who transgressed from the perceived standard of woman’s virtuous character upon which the male relatives’ honour was dependent.[26]
The killer must have committed the crime immediately in response to the act of adultery indicative of a fit of fury.[27] This model transforms the psychological elements of “surprise” and “fury” into a statutory shield, codifying a patriarchal paradigm where female transgression is legally recognised as an “unjustifiable and dangerous act”,[28] thereby justifying the burden of the violence onto the victim’s own conduct.[29]
This article is implicated in the use of honour killings, and consequently the courts have drastically reduced punishments for murder in this context in case the victim’s family agrees to either waive charges or not press charges at all.[30] Because honour killings as aforementioned have a nexus to a broader group of familial relatives, perpetrators often walk away with highly mitigated punishments.[31]
Alternatively, elements from United Kingdom law provide a progressive model for the elimination of this defence. Historically, English common law allowed for the defence of provocation.[32] However, recognising the potential for this defence to be misused in cases of domestic and honour-based violence, the legislature intervened[33]. Sections 54 and 55 of the Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, effectively abolished the defence of provocation and replaced it with a much narrower statutory defence of “loss of self-control” in murder cases, which was also excluded in the context of crimes of sexual infidelity.[34] This section, therefore, statutorily excludes the defence of loss of self-control/provocation in cases of sexual infidelity as a mitigating factor resulting in diminished criminal responsibility.[35]
Authors contend that under UK law, the exclusionary ground of sexual infidelity includes honour killing, as both stem from resorting to patriarchal values to excuse violence;[36] therefore, it establishes that an honour-based motive fundamentally negates the legal validity of a “loss of self-control” claim.[37] It asserts that the enforcement of a perceived honour code is a deliberate, punitive act that cannot be mitigated by the victim’s behaviour.[38]
Thus, a baseline definition of honour killing needs to include a statutory bar on the defence of grave and sudden provocation as well as loss of self-control in cases pertaining to honour-related motives and thus is an essential constituent element for defining and effectively prosecuting the crime of honour killing.
Shortcomings in Pakistan’s Legal Framework Pertinent to Honour Killing
2.1. Introduction
The overall legal framework governing honour killings in Pakistan are deeply rooted in patriarchal values and customs, often undermining the protections provided by the Statute. Parliament has attempted to curb the prevalent issues pertinent to honour killings; however little improvement is experienced in practice as these legislative regimes attempt to disguise the issues with surface- level solutions (harsher punishments) without targeting grassroots issues. This chapter critically analyses the evolution of each law and its treatment of honour killing in terms of possible solutions offered for the curtailment of honour killings as a form of murder. It further explores how judicial discretion at instances enabled the crime through judgments favouring perpetrators, thereby requiring a re-evaluation of honour killing as a crime of intentional murder.
2.2. Pre-Reform Foundation: Qisas and Diyat Provisions
Qisas and Diyat provisions as incorporated in the Pakistan Penal Code pursuant to the Supreme Court’s Shariat Bench decision in the Federation of Pakistan v Gul Hassan and others[39] provided an avenue for the offenders of honour killing to evade criminal responsibility. This gravely impacted the legal treatment of honour killings in Pakistan.
The Supreme Court held in this case that sections 299–338 of the PPC pertaining to homicide were repugnant to Islamic injunctions because, in cases of murder and bodily harm, they failed to provide for qisas and diyat and did not allow for compromise between parties or pardon by the victim’s heirs.[40]
Following this, the Qisas and Diyat provisions replaced earlier categories of murder with four new ones: Qatl-i-amd liable to qisas, punishable under section 302(a), Qatl-i-amd liable to tazir, punishable under section 302(b), Qatl-i-amd where qisas is not applicable—punishable under section 302(c) and Qatl-i-amd not liable to qisas—punishable under section 308.[41]
The most crucial element that provided leverage to offenders in the context of Qisas and Diyat provisions was the concept of wali.[42]Wali was defined as “a person entitled to claim qisas”.[43] Under section 305, victim’s heir, as per the victim’s personnel law, was declared Wali. Sections 309 and 310 then allowed an adult sane wali to “either waive the right to qisas altogether or compound the offence by accepting badal-i-sulh (agreed compensation)”.[44] As discussed in chapter 1, honour killing is almost always committed by family members. Thus, the concept of wali in honour killings allowed the same perpetrators or persons with vested interests in perpetrators to act as Walis. In the case of Samia Sarwar, as cited by the NCSW, the victim’s brother acted as Wali, compounding her murder at the hands of their parents, who were then set free.[45]
Another contributing factor was the unchecked, discretionary powers conferred upon the judges while deciding upon cases of murder and bodily harm.[46] Under Section 338F, the courts were allowed to decide according to Islamic injunctions set forth in the Quran and Sunnah without setting any interpreting guidelines in the statute itself for construing Islamic injunctions.[47] This amounted to giving legal cover to judicial decisions that gravely affected the rights of victims of honour killings. For instance, in Ghulam Yasin v The State[48], the Lahore High Court stated that Section 338F empowers the court to take into account the Islamic injunctions in honour killing cases. The court, while citing hadith prohibiting honour killing, interpreted the same to principally establish that murder committed on account of ghairat (honour) and qatl-i-amd are not the same, and therefore, while ruling on the former, the perpetrators of the offence deserve some concession.[49]
Further, Sections 306(b) and 306(c) further statutorily excluded certain family members,[50] which as discussed in Chapter 1 constitutes an essential constituent element of honour killing, as most often honour killing is committed by family members. Thus, parents who murder their children, or a spouse who murders their partner while surviving children exist, were exempted from qisas altogether, leaving them only liable to diyat and a discretionary maximum of 14 years’ imprisonment as Tazir.
The net effect was that the plea of sudden and grave provocation removed from the PPC by the Gul Hassan decision was effectively reintroduced through Section 338F which allowed judicial interpretation of Islamic injunctions.[51]
Courts, therefore, routinely declared victims not masoom-ud-dam (not innocent) based on their own conduct justifying leniency in punishment to perpetrators in honour killing cases, as seen in Sarfraz v The State[52] or under the concept of self-defence justifies it as “an extenuating ground for lenient punishment while exercising judicial discretion in interpreting Islamic injunctions.”[53]
2.3. Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2004
In 2004, the Parliament legislated on the issue of honour killing, making it unlawful by introducing a multitude of changes in the PPC through the CLA 2004. This Act was passed as a result of years of advocacy from within civil society, but it still failed to uproot certain laws that facilitated honour killing[54]. The Act, however, also introduced a few key improvements- a positive step further from the Qisas and Diyat provisions.
Section 2 of CLA 2004 defined honour crimes as offences “committed in the name or on the pretext of karo kari, siyah kari or similar other customs or practices”. It further categorised qatl-i-amd based on honour-related motives under section 302(a) or (b), preventing it from falling under the more lenient section 302(c).[55] It also amended Section 305 of the PPC partially altering the concept of wali by barring the accused/convict from acting as wali of the victim. Further, the compoundability or waiver of honour crimes was subject to court discretion depending upon the distinct facts and the circumstances of each case. These key changes failed to redress the prevalent issue of honour killing, as critical loopholes persisted.
The right to waive or compound qisas remained unchanged in honour killing cases, creating room for compromise between parties, which was inevitable as such crimes are most often committed by family members.
While courts could now impose conditions upon waiver and compoundability due to statutory discretion provided under Section 12 of the CLA 2004, this practically fostered no improvement. The Act failed to require judges to first enquire whether the offence had an honour-based motive. Consequently, to avoid the harsher punishment which imposed a minimum ten-year imprisonment even on perpetrators for whom the right of qisas had been compounded or waived, offenders would simply deny the honour-based motive. [56]
Further, the definition of honour crimes did not include ” committed due to grave and sudden provocation,” allowing judges to grant concessions on this basis. This perpetuated the pre-2004 judicial trend wherein courts despite the formal removal of this plea by the Gul Hassan case continued to extend leniency to perpetrators by treating provocation as a mitigating circumstance, often under the guise of Islamic injunctions.
Furthermore, the 10-year minimum punishment did not apply across all categories mandatorily but applied only where qisas had already been waived or compounded. Whereas courts retained discretion over tazir sentences, lenient punishments were commonly observed. Thus, there was no mandatory minimum sentence irrespective of perpetrators protected under Sections 306 (b) and 306 (c).
The case laws post the 2004 Amendment Act suggest that any intended utility of the New Amendment Act in curtailment of honour killing and honour crimes was cancelled out by the usage of the grave and sudden provocation plea.[57]
In the case of Muhammad Qasim v the State[58], the Supreme Court distinguished between crimes committed on the pretext of honour and those committed on grave and sudden provocation. While referencing the proviso of Section 302 of the PPC, as introduced through the CLA 2004, the court stated that the definition “in the name or pretext of honour” referred to the pre-meditated nature of the offence and therefore was not to be confused with crimes committed on grave and sudden provocation which occur due to loss of self-control. The courts, therefore, exploiting the statutory laxity of the definition excluded, the majority of honour-killing cases from the protective reach of the Act.[59]
2.4. Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offences in the Name or Pretext of Honour) Act 2016
The CLA 2016 was passed in the wake of Qandeel Baloch’s murder by her brother on the pretext of honour. The 2016 Act subsequently introduced the most critical change to the PPC by substituting Section 311 of the PPC to curtail the facilitation of honour killings at the hands of legislation. It mandated a mandatory minimum life sentence upon conviction for honour killing, removing the family’s ability to pardon the perpetrator and trigger acquittal.[60]
However, the Act still retained critical weaknesses, negating the effect of the aforementioned progressive legislative change. The Act failed to define what parameters constitute murder, a crime of ‘honour’. The phrase “killing in the name of or on the pretext of honour” was not defined, allowing perpetrators to easily escape the mandatory jail term set out for honour killing by denying the honour-based motive of the crime. As a result, perpetrators were charged under the ordinary Section 302 PPC, where the family members effectively retained the right to both waiver and compounding under Section 311. So essentially, honour killing was still compoundable.
Moreover, in the absence of defining the constituent elements of honour killing, the matter remained dependent upon subjective judicial discretion. The problem with this subjective judicial discretion was two-fold, as evident from the plethora of case law both prior to and post the 2016 Amendment. Firstly, it has no uniform application; the same court at instances would uphold a regressive interpretation of the law but also at other instances deliver progressive judgment on the same matter, putting the case law development in constant limbo.[61] Secondly, the subjective discretion of the judiciary predominantly facilitated the perpetration of honour killings by handing out lenient rulings, lending legitimacy to patriarchal notions reflective of the misogynistic sentiment prevalent and widespread within the society.[62]
One practical instance of this is reflected in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. The Supreme Court in Muhammad Abbas v The State[63] set aside the principle of law that had distinguished honour killing from killing committed on the impulse of ghairat due to grave and sudden provocation for two reasons. First, any such distinction contradicted the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the CLA 2016, which was enacted specifically to close the legal loopholes that enabled perpetrators to evade criminal responsibility for honour killing[64]. Second, the provisos inserted into Section 302 of the PPC by the 2016 Criminal Law (Amendment) Act did not create, nor did they intend to create, any exception for honour-based killings committed on the basis of provocation, as had previously been recognised under Exception 1 of the old PPC Section 300 which existed prior to the inclusion of Qisas and Diyat provisions to the PPC[65]. On the contrary, the provisos expressly placed such killings within the harsher categories of Section 302(a) and (b), not the more lenient Section 302(c)[66].
The same court, however, in Sabtain Haider v The State[67], again reiterated this principle of law that had been earlier set aside by the Supreme Court. The court bolstered support for this relegated principle of law by relying on the Homicide Act of 1957, a statutory law prevalent in the United Kingdom. It did so without taking into account that the Homicide Act was amended by the Coroners and Justice Act, 2009 which, as per its Section 56, abolishes the common law defence of provocation in the case of murder and replaces it with its own Sections 54 and 55, which provide the loss of self-control defence in murder cases.[68] This Act, however, in its Section 55(6)(c) excludes the defence of loss of self-control to murder committed on an honour-based motive as a ground of diminished responsibility for murder.[69] Thus, contending that a killing in such cases cannot be mitigated based on the plea of grave and sudden provocation.
Evidentiary Law: Shifting the Burden of Proof from the Prosecution to the Defence
3.1. Introduction
Criminal responsibility in honour killing cases in Pakistan is structurally impeded by an inadequate evidentiary framework. For example, evidentiary law does not account for honour killings committed in the privacy of homes by family members who are the only available witnesses, exposing a fundamental tension between the conventional burden of proof and the practical reality of honour killings. This chapter, therefore, critically analyses the evidentiary principles governing the burden of proof in honour killings and the extent to which Pakistan’s current legal framework fails to hold perpetrators accountable by allowing the perpetrators to exploit the evidentiary gaps. It further explores how judicial interpretation has, at instances, supplemented this evidentiary deficit most prominently in the Qandeel Baloch murder case by adopting an unnecessarily restrictive approach to circumstantial evidence. Thus, it is imperative to statutorily rebalance the evidentiary burden reflective of the realities of honour killings. By drawing comparative analysis with Indian jurisprudence and the most recent landmark Ayaz Adil judgment of the Lahore High Court, this chapter advocates the case for codifying a presumption of knowledge and explanatory burden within the QSO, reflective of Sections 117 and 118 of India’s BSA, followed by consistent judicial interpretation thereof.
3.2. General Principles of Burden of Proof in Criminal Law
Criminal evidentiary law in Pakistan rests upon the principle that the guilt of the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[70] This principle is universally recognised across common law jurisdictions. It is also deeply rooted in the constitutional law provisions of due process[71] and the Islamic jurisprudence under the maxim of “al-yaqīn la yazūlu bi’al-shakk”, which contends that in criminal law, certainty (Yaqin) cannot be replaced with doubt (shakk).[72] The principle, therefore, operates as the foundation of Pakistan’s criminal justice process.
The aforementioned principle of legal burden is coupled with “Nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare” (no one is bound to incriminate himself), a legal principle consistently upheld by Pakistani jurisprudence to further entrench the rights of an accused, particularly the right to silence.[73] The accused, consequently, possesses the right and not the obligation to testify under sections 342 and 340(2) of the CrPC. The silence of the accused cannot lead to conviction alone. This principle also finds relevance with the golden thread doctrine established by a landmark English decision, which defined the common law criminal procedure.[74] The golden thread doctrine stipulates that the burden of proof is untenable, requiring the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[75]
The Law of evidence, apart from the aforementioned concept of legal burden, also recognises the concept of evidential burden. Unlike a legal burden, it is not fixed, requiring a party to present sufficient evidence on an issue to keep it under court consideration. Once the prosecution establishes a prima facie case, an evidential burden may shift to the accused to offer an explanation, yet this does not displace the legal burden, which remains immutable and remains with the State.[76] This distinction between the legal and evidential burden is critical to understanding the framework of honour killings, where the shifting of burden is imperative.
In criminal law the standard of proof is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ which has been given substantive context in Pakistan’s evidentiary framework through Article 2(4) of the QSO 1984. Article 2(4) provides that “a fact is said to be proved when the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.”[77] The Lahore High Court clarified that this ‘probability formula’ does not lower the threshold of proof below ‘beyond reasonable doubt’; rather, the probability supplements evidence but never substitutes it.[78]
The forms of proof for qatl-i-amd (intentional homicide) liable to Qisas are prescribed under Section 304 of the PPC, which contemplates a true and voluntary confession before a competent court; or evidence as provided under Article 17 of the QSO.[79] Article 17 provides for all admissible forms of evidence including testimonial, documentary, forensic, and circumstantial evidence under the broadly worded Article 17 (2) (b) which states, all other such evidence as the circumstance justifies.[80] This concept of circumstantial evidence adduced through Article 17 of the QSO has also been reiterated in Lahore High Court Judgment, Pakistani jurisprudence, Islamic injunctions[81] that confirmed circumstantial evidence is a legitimate form of proof and, in appropriate cases, may alone be sufficient to sustain a conviction under section 302(b) of the PPC (punishment as ta’zir), provided the chain of circumstances is complete and points exclusively to the guilt of the accused.[82]
3.3. Application and Justifications for Shifting the Burden of Proof
The evidentiary challenge in honour killing cases stems from the secretive nature of the offence, as such offences are committed in secrecy, inside the bounds of the house, by the family members to restore their tarnished reputation within the community.[83] Moreover, witnesses, if any, are family members who are either complicit or actively participate in honour killing.[84]The crime scene is, therefore, routinely cleaned or tampered with, and the death is concealed under the guise of suicide or accident.[85] In this evidentiary vacuum, the conventional demand for direct, ocular evidence becomes untenable. It is in this context that a rebalancing of the burden of proof acquires both practical and doctrinal justification. While formulating this balance, comparative analysis is done with Indian jurisprudence, as it has catered to similar issues of standard of proof in circumstances where women are killed within the bounds of their homes by family members in secrecy either due to strained marital relations or doubts with regard to their character. The Indian courts in such regard state that in the absence of direct/ocular evidence, predominantly in cases of violence against women, the burden of proof shifts from the prosecution to the defence once the prosecution has succeeded in proving a fact through reasonable inferences.[86] The fact should, however, be within the accused’s special knowledge.[87] The Indian Supreme Court has noted in State of Maharashtra v Suresh:
“Such incriminating links of facts could, if at all, have been only explained by the appellant, and by nobody else, that being personally and exclusively within his knowledge. Of late, courts have, from the falsity of the defence plea and false answers given to court, when questioned, found the missing links to be supplied by such answers for completing the chain of incriminating circumstances necessary to connect the person concerned with the crime committed.”[88]
The Indian Supreme Court contends that it is essential for courts to deal with cases of violence against women in a more realistic, sensitive manner such that criminals, on account of procedural technicalities, perfunctory investigation, and insignificant lacunas, do not go unpunished for serious crimes.[89]
The Lahore High Court acknowledges this justification for the rebalancing of the standard of burden of proof in honour killing cases.[90] The consensus position, therefore, articulated in this case law is that the prosecution must firstly establish the foundational facts such as presence or control of the accused, unnatural death, motive, corroborative evidence, etc. Once this prima facie threshold is crossed, the evidential burden shifts to the accused to explain the facts within his special knowledge.[91]
This shift needs to be statutorily codified in order to secure convictions in honour killings, something which is absent in CLA 2016. This codificationcan be legislatively justified in addition to the aforementioned social and cultural context under Articles 121, 122, and 129 of the QSO. Article 122 addresses facts, especially within the knowledge of the accused, that are of particular significance.
This Article creates a rebuttable presumption which obligates the accused to explain facts that are within his special knowledge. However, as confirmed by the Supreme Court jurisprudence, the operation of Article 122 is dependent upon the requisition of direct evidence by the prosecution establishing the accused’s special knowledge.[92] This is quite counterintuitive, as the entire scheme comes into play in the absence of a substantiating case through direct evidence. This is where Pakistani jurisprudence converges from the Indian jurisprudence, as the former requires direct evidence to substantiate a rebuttable presumption;[93] whereas the latter relies upon indirect, circumstantial evidence.[94] Thus, the codification needs to account for this judicial misinterpretation, with a need to align with Indian Jurisprudence. This is not to relieve the prosecution of its duty; rather, it aims to establish facts which are within the accused’s special knowledge, which may be disproportionately difficult or even impossible for the prosecution to prove, but the accused may do so without difficulty or inconvenience.
Moreover, Article 129 of the QSO 1984 supplements this framework. Under Article 129(h) courts are allowed to draw an adverse inference from the failure of a party to offer evidence on a matter within its special knowledge.[95] The Lahore High Court, therefore, affirmed the applicability of Article 129(h) in honour killing cases where the evidentiary shift of burden takes place.[96] This adverse inference is not, however, an independent ground of conviction; it is a corroborative circumstance that supplements already-established evidence.[97]
The standard against which the evidential shift operates is described as a ‘prima facie case’, meaning a realistic chance at conviction in honour killings.[98] This standard falls short of the beyond reasonable doubt threshold but nevertheless requires a substantive evidentiary foundation.[99] The court’s reliance is upon the ‘bursting bubble’ theory of presumptions as per which once the prosecution raises a presumption based on certain credible foundational facts, it shifts the evidential burden to the accused; if the accused rebuts it with any plausible explanation, the presumption ‘bursts’ and the normal burden is restored.[100]
Additionally, the nature and amount of evidence required in secret honour killings committed in the privacy of households as discussed earlier, for a number of reasons cannot be of the same degree as in ordinary circumstantial evidence cases.[101] Therefore, a formal modulation to the evidentiary burden, tailored to the structural realities of honour killings, is required which needs to be adopted within Pakistan’s evidentiary framework through statutory reform.
This legislative justification for a formal statutory reversal of the evidentiary burden is further illustrated by the models adopted in comparable jurisdictions. The Indian evidence law, BSA, 2023, Section 117 creates a rebuttable presumption regarding abetment where a woman commits suicide within 7 years of marriage, and Section 118 creates a presumption regarding dowry death where cruelty is shown to have been inflicted upon a woman before death, respectively[102]. These provisions operate by presuming guilt upon proof of foundational facts, thereby shifting the burden to the accused to rebut the presumption. This is specifically advocated for adoption in Pakistan with an equivalent statutory mechanism in the QSO 1984 in the context of honour killings.[103]
3.4. Effectiveness and Judicial Reception of Shifting the Burden of Proof
The effectiveness of reversing the evidentiary burden in honour killing prosecutions is based on two objectives. First, to ensure that perpetrators who commit honour killings behind a veil of family silence do not escape accountability on account of uncontextualised high standard of burden of proof;[104] and second, to ensure that the modified standard of proof is exercised with caution and care, not affecting the rights of an accused by requiring them to make up for the inability of the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.[105]
The empirical backdrop is sobering as the conviction rate in cases of honour killing remains low, largely due to the systemic evidentiary deficit caused by family silence and evidence destruction. The failure of the prosecution in the very case before the Lahore High Court, that discusses modification in the evidentiary framework to secure convictions in honour killings illustrates the structural evidentiary impediments in securing convictions even where murder on the pretext of honour is not disputed.
Judicial reception of the burden-shifting principle among Pakistani courts reveals a cautious but increasingly affirmative trajectory. For instance, the Supreme Court in Saeed Ahmad v The State[106]held that an accused’s failure to explain circumstances within his special knowledge, such as not reporting the death of his wife, not taking her to hospital, not participating in her last rites, and absconding for two months, constitutes an adverse circumstance when considered alongside other corroborative evidence. The Supreme Court in Muhammad Ijaz alias Jajj v The State[107] similarly affirmed the relevance of an accused’s conduct before, during, and after the commission of the offence as circumstantial evidence for the purposes of Article 17 of the QSO 1984. These decisions lay a traceable lineage of judicial acceptance for the principle that an accused in a domestic killing who fails to offer any account of the death assumes a heavier evidential responsibility.
However, in Qandeel Baloch’s case[108] the Lahore High Court adopted a restrictive approach, declining to draw reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence (including videos and pictorial content) to establish that the murder was committed on the account of honour. The court reasoned that since the accused had not explicitly identified honour as his motive in his confession, conviction on the pretext of honour killing could not be recorded by presuming facts[109]. This approach demonstrates judicial resistance that continues to impede the effective operation of the circumstantial evidence framework in honour killing cases.
The Lahore High Court in Ayaz Adil represents a deliberate attempt to reset this judicial trajectory. By framing the question of burden-shifting as a structured legal inquiry, appointing amici curiae, synthesizing Pakistani, Indian, and Islamic jurisprudential sources, and articulating a three-step evidentiary formula, the Court has provided an authoritative and nuanced statement of the law that subsequent courts may follow. The judgment’s endorsement of the ‘probability formula’ in Article 2(4) of the QSO 1984 — as a tool of evaluation, not a relaxation of the standard of proof — provides clarity on a provision that had hitherto been applied inconsistently.
The recommended legislative intervention is to consider codifying a ‘presumption of knowledge and explanatory burden’ applicable to honour killings along the lines of sections 117 and 118 of the Indian Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 to provide a clear and predictable statutory basis for the evidentiary burden-shift, which can then subsequently be followed by uniform judicial application.
CONCLUSION
Honour killings in Pakistan represent a crisis that legislation has consistently failed to address. Substantial reforms need to be introduced in the law governing honour killings, centred upon two critical imperatives: the statutory definition of honour killing and the restructuring of the evidentiary burden of proof.
In the absence of a clear statutory definition of honour killing, a persistent, routinely exploitable legal vacuum exists primarily due to the recharacterization of the crime as ordinary homicide under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code or mitigation by underdeveloped jurisprudence regarding the plea of grave and sudden provocation.
Moreover, the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard, as currently applied in Pakistan, is structurally incompatible with the secretive and familial nature of honour killings. The evidential burden may legitimately shift to the accused once the prosecution establishes a prima facie case through circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences, without displacing the legal burden of the State.
Taken together, these reforms are not merely procedural adjustments; they ensure that perpetrators of honour killings are no longer afforded legislative and judicial impunity.
REFERENCES
‘Surah Yousaf’, Holy Quran, verses 25, 26, 27.
A Clough, ‘Honour killings, partial defences and the exclusionary conduct model’ [2016] Journal of Criminal Law 80, 3, 177-187.
A Tripathi and S. Yadav, ‘For the Sake of Honour: But Whose Honour?’ [2004] Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 5, 64.
Adil, Kamran, ‘Justice Sector Response to Honour Killings in Pakistan.’ [2025] Research Society for International Law (RSIL).
A George, Jordan: living in the crossfire (Zed Books 2005) 199.
A Khan, ‘‘Honour’ Killings in Pakistan: Judicial and Legal Treatment of the Crime: A Feminist Perspective.’ [2020] LUMS Law Journal, vol. 7, no. 1.
Amendment of section 338E, Act XLV of 1860, the Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offences in the name or pretext of Honour) Act 2016.
Amendment of section 338E, Act XLV of 1860, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2004.
A Parrot and N Cummings, Forsaken Females: The Global Brutalization of Women (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 180.
C Warrick, ‘The Vanishing Victim: Criminal Law and Gender in Jordan’ [2005] Law & Society Review 39, 2, 326.
C Kapoor, ‘Presumption as to Dowry Death: An Analysis of Section 113B of Law of Evidence Act, 1872’ [2023] Jus Corpus Law Journal 3, no.[1][2] 2, 802.
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK).
D Mayeda and R Vijaykumar, ‘A Review of the Literature on Honor‐based Violence’ [2016] Sociology Compass 10, 5, 353-363.
Dr Goswami and S Goswami, ‘”Fill in the Blanks” in Chain of Evidence: Role Reversal for Burden of Proof’ [2022] Research Gate.
Dr Kurrey, ‘Honor Killings in India: Legal Responses and Societal Challenges’ [2024] International Journal of Law Management & Humanities 7 (5).
Family Law Act 1996 (UK).
F K Nesheiwat, ‘Honor Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment Under Islamic and Jordanian Criminal Laws’ [2004] Penn St. Int’l L Rev 23, 276-80.
Human Rights Watch, ‘Honouring the Killers: Justice Denied For ‘Honour Crimes in Jordan’’ [2004] Human Rights Watch Vol. 14. No. 1 < https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/04/19/honoring-killers/justice-denied-honor-crimes-jordan> accessed 1 April 2026.
I. Leader-Elliott, ‘Passion and insurrection in the law of sexual provocation’ in Sexing the Subject of Law, ed. N. Naffine and R. J. Owens (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), 149.
J A Cohan, ‘Honour killings and the Cultural Defence,’ [2009-10] Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 40, 177.
J Singh, ‘Understanding Honor Killings in India: A Legal and Social Analysis,’ [2019] Indian Journal of Law and Society, vol. 12, no. 2, 105.
K. Fitz-Gibbon, ‘Replacing Provocation in England and Wales: Examining the Partial Defence of Loss of Control’ [2013] Journal of Law and Society 40, 2, 280-305.
L Abu-Odeh, ‘Comparatively Speaking: The ‘Honor’ of the ‘East’ and the ‘Passion’ of the ‘West’’ [1997] Utah Law Review 2, 292-93.
L Abu-Odeh, ‘Crimes of honour and the construction of gender in Arab societies’ in Feminism and Islam: Legal and literary perspectives, ed. M. Yamani, (New York University Press 1996), 162-63.
L Abu-Odeh, ‘Critical Direction’s in Comparative Family Law: Honour killings and the Construction of Gender in Arab Societies’ [2010] Am J. Comp. L 58, 924
L Pervizat, ‘In the Name of Honour’ [2003] Human Rights Dialogue 2, 30.
M Hussain, ‘Take My Riches, Give Me Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Pakistan’s Honor Crimes Legislation’ [2006] Harvard Journal of Law & Gender 29, 227, 232.
N S Kim, ‘The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption: A Framework for Analysis’ [1997] NML Review 27, 119-121.
N Creighton, ‘The Presumption of Innocence: Absolute Right or Limited?’ [2025] QUB Lawyers Without Borders, Student Articles.
P Sartorio, ‘Qandeel Baloch’s Sacrifice – A Review on Pakistan’s Anti-Honor Crime Bill and Its Effectiveness as a Legal Tool to Safeguard Women from Honor Killings in Pakistan’ [2017] INTERDISC. J. OF L. FORENSIC SCI., Vol. 2, Issue 1, 39-50.
Pakistan Penal Code 1860.
P Tare, ‘Honour killings as multiple violation of Woman’s Human Rights’ [2012] SSRN <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2868979> accessed 1 April 2026
A Singh, ‘Honor Killings in India: A Study of the Causes and Impact.’ [2014] International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, vol. 3, no. 3, 92-97.
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1997.
The Qanun-e-Shahadat Ordinance 1984.
Turkish Penal Code (TR).
UK Home Office, ‘Domestic Abuse Act 2021 Statutory Guidance’ [2022].
UK Ministry of Justice, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law – Summary of Responses and Government Position (Consultation Paper, CP 19/08, 2009) 14.
V Tadros and S Tierney, ‘The Presumption of Innocence and the Human Rights Act’ [2004] The Modern Law Review 67(3), 402, 409.
[1] UK Home Office, Domestic Abuse Act 2021 Statutory Guidance’ [2022] [29].
[2] Aleena Khan, ‘‘Honour’ Killings in Pakistan: Judicial and Legal Treatment of the Crime: A Feminist Perspective.’ [2020] LUMS Law Journal, vol 7, no 1.
[3] Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: The ‘Honor’ of the ‘East’ and the ‘Passion’ of the ‘West’ [1997] Utah Law Review 2, 292-93.
[4] UK Home Office, Domestic Abuse Act 2021 Statutory Guidance’ [2022] [87].
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid [88].
[7] UK Home Office (n 27) [28].
[8] Family Law Act 1996 (UK), s 63.
[9] UK Home Office (n 27) [28].
[10] Leyla Pervizat, In the Name of Honour’ [2003] Human Rights Dialogue 2, 30; John Alan Cohan, Honour killings and the Cultural Defence,’ [2009-10] Cal W Int’l L J 40, 177.
[11] UK Home Office, Domestic Abuse Act 2021 Statutory Guidance’ [2022] [90].
[12] D. Mayeda and R. Vijaykumar, ‘A Review of the Literature on Honor‐based Violence’ [2016] Sociology Compass 10, 5, 353-363.
[13] UK Home Office (n 34) [88].
[14] Pulkit Tare, ‘Honour killings as multiple violation of Woman’s Human Rights’ [2012] SSRN <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2868979> accessed 1 April 2026; Mazna Hussain, ‘Take My Riches, Give Me Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Pakistan’s Honor Crimes Legislation’ [2006] Harvard Journal of Law & Gender 29, 227, 232.
[15] Human Rights Watch, ‘Honouring the Killers: Justice Denied For ‘Honour Crimes in Jordan’’ [2004] Human Rights Watch Vol. 14. No. 1 < https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/04/19/honoring-killers/justice-denied-honor-crimes-jordan> accessed 1 April 2026.
[16] Mazna Hussain, ‘Take My Riches, Give Me Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Pakistan’s Honor Crimes Legislation’ [2006] Harvard Journal of Law & Gender 29, 227, 232.
[17] Turkish Penal Code (TR), article 82(1)(k).
[18] Pulkit Tare, ‘Honour killings as multiple violation of Woman’s Human Rights’ [2012] SSRN, 61 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2868979> accessed 1 April 2026.
[19] Catherine Warrick, ‘The Vanishing Victim: Criminal Law and Gender in Jordan’ [2005] Law & Society Review 39, 2, 326.
[20] People of the State of New York v Chen Lu [1989] No. 87-7774 (New York Supreme Court); Nancy S Kim, The Cultural Defense and the Problem of Cultural Preemption: A Framework for Analysis’ [1997] NML Review 27, 119-121.
[21] Lama Abu-Odeh, ‘Crimes of honour and the construction of gender in Arab societies’ in Feminism and Islam: Legal and literary perspectives, ed. M. Yamani, (New York University Press 1996), 162-63.
[22] Catherine Warrick, ‘The Vanishing Victim: Criminal Law and Gender in Jordan’ [2005] Law & Society Review 39, 2, 326.
[23] Pulkit Tare, ‘Honour killings as multiple violation of Woman’s Human Rights’ [2012] SSRN <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2868979> accessed 1 April 2026.
[24] Jordanian Penal Code (JO), article 340.
[25] Alan George, Jordan: living in the crossfire (Zed Books 2005) 199.
[26] Catherine Warrick, ‘The Vanishing Victim: Criminal Law and Gender in Jordan’ [2005] Law & Society Review 39, 2, 326; Ferris K. Nesheiwat, ‘Honor Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment Under Islamic and Jordanian Criminal Laws’ [2004] Penn St. Int’l L Rev 23, 276-80.
[27] Jordanian Penal Code (JO), article 98.
[28] Jordanian Penal Code (JO), article 98; Lama Abu-Odeh, ‘Critical Direction’s in Comparative Family Law: Honour killings and the Construction of Gender in Arab Societies’ [2010] Am J Comp L 58, 924; Alan George, Jordan: living in the crossfire (Zed Books 2005) 199.
[29] Andrea Parrot and Nina Cummings, Forsaken Females: The Global Brutalization of Women (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 180.
[30] Human Rights Watch, ‘Honouring the Killers: Justice Denied For ‘Honour Crimes in Jordan’’ [2004] Human Rights Watch Vol 14 No 1 < https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/04/19/honoring-killers/justice-denied-honor-crimes-jordan> accessed 1 April 2026.
[31] Ibid 19.
[32] K Fitzgibbon, Replacing Provocation in England and Wales: Examining the Partial Defence of Loss of Control’ [2013] Journal of Law and Society 40, 2, 280-305.
[33] I. Leader-Elliott, Passion and insurrection in the law of sexual provocation’ in Sexing the Subject of Law, ed N Naffine and R. J. Owens (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), 149.
[34] Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 55 (6) (c).
[35] Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 55 (6) (c); UK Ministry of Justice, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law – Summary of Responses and Government Position (Consultation Paper, CP 19/08, 2009) 14.
[36] A Tripathi and S Yadav, ‘For the Sake of Honour: But Whose Honour?’ [2004] Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and Law 5, 64.
[37] A Clough, Honour killings, partial defences and the exclusionary conduct model’ [2016] Journal of Criminal Law 80, 3, 177-187.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and another v Gul Hassan Khan [1989] PLD 1989 SC 633 (Supreme Court of Pakistan).
[40] Ibid.; Aleena Khan, ‘‘Honour’ Killings in Pakistan: Judicial and Legal Treatment of the Crime: A Feminist Perspective.’ [2020] LUMS Law Journal, vol. 7, no. 1, 76.
[41] The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1997, s 7.
[42] Aleena Khan, ‘‘Honour’ Killings in Pakistan: Judicial and Legal Treatment of the Crime: A Feminist Perspective.’ [2020] LUMS Law Journal, vol 7, no 1, 79.
[43] Act 1997 (n 64).
[44] Act 1997 (n 64).
[45] National Commission on the Status of Women, Study Research Report on Qisas and Diyat Laws, quoted in Khan (n 65) 80.
[46] Khan (n 65) 80.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ghulam Yasin v The State [1994] PLD 1994 Lah 392 (Lahore High Court).
[49] Ghulam Yasin v The State [1994] PLD 1994 Lah 392 (Lahore High Court).
[50] The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1997, s 7.
[51] Aleena Khan, ‘‘Honour’ Killings in Pakistan: Judicial and Legal Treatment of the Crime: A Feminist Perspective.’ [2020] LUMS Law Journal, vol 7, no 1, 86–87.
[52] Sarfraz v The State [2008] 2008 YLR 969 (Lahore High Court).
[53] Muhammad Imran v The State [2008] 2008 YLR 1290 (Lahore High Court) [13]; Ali Mohammad v Ali Muhammad [1996] PLD 1996 SC 274 (Supreme Court of Pakistan).
[54] Aleena Khan, ‘‘Honour’ Killings in Pakistan: Judicial and Legal Treatment of the Crime: A Feminist Perspective.’ [2020] LUMS Law Journal, vol 7, no 1, 81.
[55] The Criminal Law Amendment Act 2004, s 3.
[56] Ibid, s 8.
[57] Aleena Khan, ‘‘Honour’ Killings in Pakistan: Judicial and Legal Treatment of the Crime: A Feminist Perspective.’ [2020] LUMS Law Journal, vol 7, no 1, 26.
[58] Muhammad Qasim v The State [2018] PLD 2018 SC 840 (Supreme Court of Pakistan).
[59] Sabir Hussain alias Pehlwan v The State [2007] PCrLJ 1159 (Lahore High Court); Umar Zahid v The State [2009] 2009 MLD 4 (Peshawar High Court); Aurangzeb v The State [2015] 2015 YLR 912 (Peshawar High Court); Muhammad Sadiq v The State [2012] 2012 MLD 53 (Lahore High Court); Muhammad Qasim v The State [2018] PLD 2018 SC 840 (Supreme Court of Pakistan).
[60] Amendment of section 338E, Act XLV of 1860, the Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offences in the name or pretext of Honour) Act 2016, s 6.
[61] Aleena Khan, ‘‘Honour’ Killings in Pakistan: Judicial and Legal Treatment of the Crime: A Feminist Perspective.’ [2020] LUMS Law Journal, vol 7, no 1, 99.
[62] Ibid 100.
[63] Muhammad Abbas v The State [2020] 2020 PLD 620 (Supreme Court of Pakistan).
[64] Muhammad Abbas v The State [2020] 2020 PLD 620 (Supreme Court of Pakistan) [11], [16].
[65] Ibid [11], [16].
[66] Ibid [16].
[67] Sabtain Haider v The State [2022] 2022 SCMR 2012 (Supreme Court of Pakistan).
[68] Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 56.
[69] Ibid, s 55.
[70] The Qanun-e-Shahadat Ordinance 1984, article 117.
[71] Victor Tadros and Stephen Tierney, The Presumption of Innocence and the Human Rights Act [2004] the Modern Law Review 67(3), 402, 409.
[72] Ayaz Adil v The State, etc [2025] Crl a No 6763/2025 (Lahore High Court) [10]; Niaz v The State [1960] PLD 1960 SC 387 (Supreme Court of Pakistan); Wajahat v Gul Daraz [2019] 2019 SCMR 1451 (Supreme Court of Pakistan); Shaukat Hussain v The State [2022] 2022 SCMR 1358 (Supreme Court of Pakistan).
[73] Adil v State (n 95) [10].
[74] Nicole Creighton, The Presumption of Innocence: Absolute Right or Limited?’ [2025] QUB Lawyers Without Borders, Student Articles.
[75] Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, 481-482 (Judicial functions of the House of Lords).
[76] Adil v State (n 95).
[77] The Qanun-e-Shahadat Ordinance 1984, article 2(4).
[78] Ayaz Adil v The State, etc [2025] Crl. A. No.6763/2025 (Lahore High Court) [35].
[79] Pakistan Penal Code 1860, s 304.
[80] The Qanun-e-Shahadat Ordinance 1984, article 17.
[81] Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and another v Gul Hassan Khan [1989] PLD 1989 SC 633 (Supreme Court of Pakistan); ‘Surah Yousaf’, Holy Quran, verses 25, 26, 27.
[82] Adil v State (n 101) [29], [35].
[83] Jyoti Singh, ‘Understanding Honor Killings in India: A Legal and Social Analysis,’ [2019] Indian Journal of Law and Society, vol 12, no 2, 105.
[84] Leyla Pervizat, In the Name of Honour’ [2003] Human Rights Dialogue 2, 30; John Alan Cohan, Honour killings and the Cultural Defence,’ [2009-10] Cal W Int’l L J 40, 177.
[85] Dr Kurrey, ‘Honor Killings in India: Legal Responses and Societal Challenges’ [2024] International Journal of Law Management & Humanities 7 (5).
[86] State Of Rajasthan v Kashi Ram [2007] AIR 2007 SC 144 (Supreme Court of India).
[87] Dr G K Goswami and Siddhartha Goswami, “Fill in the Blanks” in Chain of Evidence: Role Reversal for Burden of Proof’ [2022] Research Gate.
[88] State of Maharashtra v Suresh [2000] 1 SCC 471 (Supreme Court of India); State of Rajasthan v Kashi Ram [2007] AIR 2007 SC 144 (Supreme Court of India).
[89] State of Madhya Pradesh. v Balveer Singh [2025] 8 SCC 545 (Supreme Court of India).
[90] Ayaz Adil v The State, etc [2025] Crl a No 6763/2025 (Lahore High Court) [15].
[91] Ibid.
[92] Saeed Ahmad v The State [2015] 2015 SCMR 710 (Supreme Court of Pakistan); Muhammad Ijaz alias Jajj v The State [2025] 2025 SCMR 1591 (Supreme Court of Pakistan).
[93] Jajj v State (n 115).
[94] Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v State of Maharashtra [2006] 10 SCC 681 (Supreme Court of India).
[95] The Qanun-e-Shahadat Ordinance 1984, article 129 (h); Fayyaz Ahmad v The State [2025] 2025 LHC 5942 (Lahore High Court).
[96] Ayaz Adil v The State, etc [2025] Crl a No 6763/2025 (Lahore High Court) [35].
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Muhammad Riaz v The State [2022] 2022 PCrLJ 1005 (Lahore High Court)
[101] Adil v State (n 119) [15].
[102] Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam 2023, s 117, 118.
[103] Ayaz Adil v The State, etc [2025] Crl a No 6763/2025 (Lahore High Court) [34].
[104] State of Madhya Pradesh. v Balveer Singh [2025] 8 SCC 545 (Supreme Court of India).
[105] Ibid.
[106] Saeed Ahmad v The State [2015] 2015 SCMR 710 (Supreme Court of Pakistan).
[107] Muhammad Ijaz alias Jajj v The State [2025] 2025 SCMR 1591 (Supreme Court of Pakistan).
[108] Naveed Asghar and 2 others v The State and another [2022] 2022 LHC 841 (Lahore High Court).
[109] Ibid.
