The Potential Of Lex Petrolea – A Uniform Code Of Petroleum Laws

The Potential Of Lex Petrolea As The Basis Of A Common Code For Regulation Of State-Company Relations In Upstream Petroleum

Introduction

The notion of lex petrolea as the basis of a common code in upstream petroleum i.e. exploration and production, has become appealing to scholars, academics and commentators in recent times. However, it is often labeled as impractical and unrealistic by the skeptics familiar with the intricacies involved in international oil and gas contracts. The concept of lex petrolea has mainly gained notable attention due to the transnational and complex nature of contracts involved in the oil and gas industry.

This research paper shall discuss the following:

• (i) the development of lex petrolea in the last two decades and its existence in international law by way of arbitral awards, model contracts, host government contracts and treaties, etc.
• (ii) identify the issues and difficulties in recognizing various forms mentioned above, to be considered as a source of lex petrolea and
• (iii) whether the Energy Charter Treaty, owing to its unique binding nature, could be considered a potential common code in this respect.

The Emergence Of Lex Petrolea

The lex petrolea, which is considered as a specific lex mercatoria for the oil sector, derived from professional standards and customs of the oil sector, does not take place in a linear way and therefore, does not exclude its evolution or changes.[1] It is, therefore, possible to identify different sources which may form part of lex petrolea.

The first time this vision of lex petrolea was adopted in practice was in Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh de Abu Dhabi case, an ad hoc arbitration that took place in 1951 where the contract itself did not expressly establish any applicable law and under its Article 17 which only indicated that it would be ‘executed in goodwill’ and in a ‘spirit of integrity’, and interpreted in a ‘reasonable’ way. The arbitral court inferred that no national legal system should be applied and that it was necessary to resort to ‘the application of principles rooted in the good sense and common practice of the generality of civilized nations, a sort of ‘modern law of nature’.[2]

At the end of 1963, the Fifth OPEC Conference also resolved “that the Secretary-General shall invite a number of experts from Member Countries and, if necessary, from other countries, to work on the compilation of a Code of Uniform Petroleum Laws.” But a uniform petroleum law – lex petrolea – failed to materialize from this initiative.[3]

Lex Petrolea And Arbitral Awards

The concept of lex petrolea was expressly considered for the first time by an Arbitration Tribunal in the case of The Government of the State of Kuwait v. The American Independent Oil Company (Kuwait v Aminoil). In that case, the issue was regarding the calculation of compensation and the Government argued that the compensation for expropriation of Aminoil’s concession should be done in a similar manner as done in the course of nationalizations of oil concessions that had occurred in the Middle East during that time period and further maintained that the method of calculating the compensation which had been suggested by the Government, acquired the status of ‘customary rule’ of international law for the oil industry i.e. lex petrolea. However, the Tribunal rejected the ‘net book value’ method proposed by the Government as an expression of lex petrolea, on the following grounds[4]:

1. The precedents of compensation for nationalisation, to which Kuwait referred, were reached through negotiations rather than arbitrations. A result of such negotiations had usually been a complex deal between an investor and a state, which involved, in addition to compensation for a nationalised concession, a preferential relationship, and prospects for future advantages or other arrangements suitable for the investor.
2. The said precedents had not constituted an expression of opinio juris and therefore could not be viewed as rules of international law.
3. Consents of investors had been given under the pressure of very strong economic and political constraints and could not constitute general rules applicable in other cases. (paras.156-157)

Thereafter, in the year 1998, a groundbreaking paper was published and authored by R. Doak Bishop titled International Arbitration of Petroleum Law: The Development of Lex Petrolea. In this paper, it was argued by the author that the decisions of the tribunals established a form of lex petrolea. The author mainly considered eleven awards, all of which were regarding the expropriation or nationalisation of the international oil companies’ exploration and production assets. The author also briefly discussed decisions pertaining to the doctrine of ‘separability of arbitration clauses’. The following pre-1998 arbitration cases were considered:[5]

1. Kuwait v. Aminoil;
2. TOPCO v. Libya;
3. LIAMCO v. Libya
4. Elf Acquitane case;
5. Sojuznefteexport v. Joc Oil, Ltd;
6. BP v. Libya;
7. TOPCO & California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libya;
8. Amoco International Finance v. Iran;
9. Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Iran;
10. AGIP v. Congo;
11. Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co.

An update of the above-mentioned work was published by Thomas C.C. Child titled Update on Lex Petrolea: The continuing development of the customary law relating to international oil and gas exploration and production. The primary difference between the two publications is that prior to 1998, not a single bilateral investment treaty (BIT) arbitration had been brought by an international oil company (IOC) (although arbitrations before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal shared some characteristics of BIT arbitrations) and only one award published since 1998 related to the nationalization of an IOC’s exploration and production assets. On the other hand, several of the post-1998 claims were brought by IOCs under BIT, providing substantive protections to foreign investors by entitling them to submit an investment dispute with the host state to international arbitration, and most of these claims were related to changes in the host state’s fiscal regime, such as imposition of windfall taxes.[6]

The gist of the arguments presented in the aforementioned papers is that international arbitral awards related to the oil and gas sector provide a roadmap for the development of lex petrolea. Admittedly, arbitrators and arbitration awards contribute to the incorporation of general principles of transnational rules or law, and when an arbitrator applies and incorporates a principle of law, he or she transforms it in a certain way, detaching it from its source which might as well be a national or international legal order and trans-nationalizes it.[7] This leads to an understanding that the arbitrator acts as an autonomous body and has important effects on the rules of law governing the validity of the arbitral agreement, rules applicable to the arbitral procedure and merits of the dispute as well as validity of an arbitral award.[8] In this way, the primary question to be raised is regarding the origins of such autonomy. What makes this body of arbitrators autonomous? Is the body of arbitrators autonomous because transnational arbitrators form a community or society of their own which is, in essence, independent from national legal orders or belongs to a transnational legal order such as the lex petrolea? It could be argued that if transnational arbitrators form a transnational legal order of their own, e.g. a transnational arbitral legal order autonomous and independent from national and international legal orders, the relevance between such order i.e. lex petrolea as a consequence would be that when arbitrators are involved in petroleum disputes they also act as organs of the lex petrolea.[9] Therefore, a transnational arbitrator involved in a petroleum dispute is also an organ of the lex petrolea and it is an expression of its organic and organisational autonomy. This is very important because transnational arbitrators −the natural judges of transnational petroleum disputes− play a fundamental role in the creation and construction of lex petrolea, if they consider that a principle satisfies the needs and interests of the transnational petroleum society.[10]

On the contrary, although past decisions are usually considered by tribunals, the problem with this theory is that there is no concept of arbitral precedents in the jurisprudence of arbitration, hence, the party relying on a previous arbitration award has no ground to argue that the arbitrator is bound by the decisions previously given or relied upon as it is related to a similar controversy. It is common knowledge that international arbitration lacks a doctrine of precedent, as it has been formulated by the common law system. For example, the absence of a doctrine of precedent can be derived from Article 53 of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, according to which ‘the award shall be binding on the parties’. This, however, does not appear to be an extremely convincing basis to deny the existence of any form of precedent in this field. Although nothing in the Convention suggests that the doctrine of stare decisis should be applied, nothing in the Convention also suggests that it should not be applied.[11] In lieu of many others, a quotation from the recent award in El Paso v. Argentina (reiterated in Pan American v. Argentina and BP v. Argentina) which is a sufficient illustration of general consensus, is reproduced hereunder[12]:

“ICSID arbitral tribunals are established ad hoc, … and the present tribunal knows of no provision, … establishing an obligation of stare decisis.”

It is nonetheless a reasonable assumption that international arbitral tribunals, notably those established within the ICSID system, will generally take account of the precedents established by other arbitration organs, especially those set by other international tribunals.

Regardless of the fact that arbitrators are not bound to follow previous decisions and decide alike matters similarly, it has been rightly argued that it is beneficial for investment tribunals that the credibility of the entire dispute resolution system depends on consistency because a dispute settlement process that produces unpredictable results will lose the confidence of the users in the long term and defeat its own purpose.[13]

Different forms of lex petrolea with common basic roots become part of international customary law. In this regard, reference could be made to Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties, Article-31(3), which states that, “The treaty interpreter shall take into account any relevant rules applicable in the relations between the parties.” It has also been argued that the Convention can lead the arbitrators to seek recourse from the general principles of law which are transnational and considered international customary principles of law.[14] This may be an acceptable argument if it is accepted that the concept of precedent and customs both fall under the same category, as the doctrine of stare decisis is itself a result of historical customary law, but what differentiates them is that the doctrine has given the custom a force of law whereas customs are still customs and are not binding in nature.

Model Contracts

The award in Saudi Arabia v. ARAMCO (1958) ruled that the “Concession Agreement is thus the fundamental law of the parties, and the Arbitration Tribunal is bound to recognize its particular importance owing to the fact that it fills a gap in the legal system of Saudi Arabia with regard to the oil industry.” Not long thereafter, Fouad Rouhani, the first Secretary-General of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), said at a United Nations Inter-Regional Seminar on Techniques of Petroleum Development in 1962 that, “The Petroleum Act lays down the general principles under which agreements may be made and describes the varieties of authorized relationships, but once an agreement is made and is ratified by the Legislature, the Petroleum Act virtually fades away because the agreement itself is the appropriate and sufficient law.”[15]

In this regard, a paper by Timothy Martin and Jay Park was published in which model contracts by organizations such as the Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN) have also been considered as emerging forms of lex petrolea. It has been rightly stated by Kim Talus, Scott Looper and Steven Otillar in Lex Petrolea and the Internationalization of Petroleum Agreements: focus on host government contracts that,

“What emerges clearly from this ongoing discussion is that the energy sector is different from many other sectors. Not only is it a major source of international case law at institutions like the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), but it is also an area where, due to specificities of the sector and through different processes of internationalization, contractual solutions to particular problems are internationally very similar and seem to follow international, rather than national, trends.”[16]

Thus, the relationship between the parties in upstream petroleum contracts is primarily governed by the form and substance of the contractual arrangement between them and whenever an arbitration claim is placed before a tribunal, for every issue the arbitrator must first turn to the contract, as it is the will of parties which governs the relationship under the terms and conditions mentioned therein.

It may be pertinent to mention that there is yet another interesting argument which supports the existence of lex petrolea inherent in model contracts, which has been considered by Alfredo D. Jesus while examining the lecture offered by Egyptian Professor Ahmed Sadek El-Kosheri at The Hague Academy of International Law on the transnational law of Petroleum Contracts.[17] In the paper, it is perceived that while considering the thesis of Professor El-Kosheri, reference has been made to the arbitrators in the Libyan cases.[18] The problem faced by arbitrators in the Libyan cases was to first determine the nature of the contracts involved. This one problem resulted in three solutions. Generally, in the international oil and gas contracts there are two parties involved i.e. the state and the IOC. The former is subject to international law and the latter to national law. This often leads to different conclusions of the same problem. In this regard, two possible theories worth noting are:

• (i) these contracts are considered as transnational contracts that are completely autonomous from national and international legal orders and as such create a legal system of their own, or
• (ii) these contracts are considered as transnational contracts that are incorporated in a transnational legal order which is itself autonomous from the national and international legal orders which is lex mercatoria and for the purpose of this paper the lex petrolea.[19]

The precise difference in considering model contracts and arbitral decisions as forms of lex petrolea is their binding nature. As stated above, there is no such doctrine of stare decisis in arbitration proceedings which is certainly not the case in model contracts. The terms and conditions governing the relationship between the parties involved in concession agreements or production sharing agreements (PSAs) are stipulated in the contract itself, being positive law. The case may be different where countries, such as the UK, have legislated the terms and conditions upon which authority is granted to exploration and production companies, which also fortifies the contention that model contracts play a significant role in establishing lex petrolea.

The Energy Charter Treaty

In order to consider the treaty as a form of lex petrolea, it is necessary to look into its origin, structure and the politics surrounding it. The origin of Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is the European Energy Charter which was a non-binding document negotiated in 1990-91 between several countries when the end of the Cold War offered an unprecedented opportunity to overcome previous economic divisions in the European continent.[20] The Charter was signed on the 17^th of December 1991 at The Hague by 47 nations, consisting of most western and eastern European nations along with the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.[21] Following the signing of the Charter, parties agreed to continue negotiations with a view of enshrining the terms of the Charter in the form of a binding treaty. The parties also agreed to open discussions on developing protocols with respect to energy efficiency, nuclear energy and hydrocarbon energy.[22] An agreement was reached on the terms of the Treaty in 1994, however, the United States, Canada and New Zealand dropped out of negotiations.[23]

The fundamental aim of the Energy Charter Treaty is to strengthen the rule of law on energy issues, by creating a level playing field of rules to be observed by all participating governments.[24] The Charter focuses on five broad areas i.e. the protection and promotion of foreign energy investments, trade, transit, efficiency and dispute settlement.[25] A secretariat has been set up to allow dialogue amongst the participating governments. The Treaty and Protocol came into effect in April 1998.

The Treaty has been acceded to or signed by fifty-two countries, the EU and Euratom. All members have ratified the Treaty with the exception of Australia, Belarus, Norway and the Russian Federation.[26] There are four levels of participation depending on the application[27]:

1. Organisation of the Energy Charter Conference;
2. 1991 Energy Charter signatory state;
3. 1994 Energy Charter Treaty and Protocol;
4. 1998 Trade Amendment ratifier state.

There are observer signatories either as members or by invitation, which is a significant step. In 2015, the International Energy Charter was signed and countries such as China had also taken interest and obtained that status. The Middle East, including OPEC members, are observers by invitation and have also taken interest in the Treaty. The participation of the Russian Federation has been particularly interesting, as it has ceased to apply the Treaty provisionally; however, the dispute settlement and investment provisions are still in field for a further 20 years.

It is often observed that states are reluctant to adopt any form of international law which infringes their sovereign right as a state. However, the ECT has drawn attention as it particularly deals with this issue as provided in Article 18(1) of the Treaty, “The Contracting Parties recognise state sovereignty and sovereign rights over energy resources. They reaffirm that these must be exercised in accordance with and subject to the rules of international law.” This recognition of the member states’ sovereignty safeguards concerns involving infringement of sovereign rights. Furthermore, it not only serves the contracting states vis-à-vis the five broad areas which the Treaty covers, but also the IOCs.

The most controversial issue which the ECT seeks to resolve is the expropriation of IOC assets by contracting states, which is the subject matter of a paper authored by Doak R. Bishop. The arbitration awards considered in this paper were all related to nationalisation. The ECT in its Article 13 expressly deals with this issue in the following manner:

Article 13 – Expropriation:

(1) Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting Party shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures having an effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as “Expropriation”) except where such Expropriation is:

(a) for a purpose which is in the public interest;
(b) not discriminatory;
(c) carried out under due process of law; and
(d) accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.

Such compensation shall amount to the fair market value of the Investment expropriated at the time immediately before the Expropriation or impending Expropriation became known in such a way as to affect the value of the Investment (hereinafter referred to as the “Valuation Date”).

Such fair market value shall at the request of the Investor be expressed in a Freely Convertible Currency on the basis of the market rate of exchange existing for that currency on the Valuation Date. Compensation shall also include interest at a commercial rate established on a market basis from the date of Expropriation until the date of payment.

(2) The Investor affected shall have a right to prompt review, under the law of the Contracting Party making the Expropriation, by a judicial or other competent and independent authority of that Contracting Party, of its case, of the valuation of its Investment, and of the payment of compensation, in accordance with the principles set out in paragraph (1).

(3) For the avoidance of doubt, Expropriation shall include situations where a Contracting Party expropriates the assets of a company or enterprise in its Area in which an Investor of any other Contracting Party has an Investment, including through the ownership of shares.

The Treaty essentially provides a mechanism for compensation and recognises a need for regulation in matters involving expropriation. Other key aspects of the Treaty are the dispute settlement mechanisms. The ECT establishes dispute settlement procedures for cases of investment-related disputes between an investor and a contracting party and for a state-to-state dispute, concerning the application or interpretation of the Treaty.[28] In addition, a more specific mechanism under the Treaty for trade-related disputes is present. This means contracting states have taken an unconditional obligation to accept the application of the Treaty whenever necessary.

In light of the above, it is necessary to question whether the Energy Charter Treaty can be considered a form of lex petrolea or an international regime relating to energy law.

An international regime is an institution designed by states that share certain common interests.[29] The main components as recognised by Philip Andrews-Speed are the principles forming the basis of the regime, the defined rights and obligations of member states, the rules that prescribe or proscribe action and the procedures for making decisions.[30] An effective regime may create a climate of trust which was not present beforehand.[31] The strength of an international regime depends on the continued coherence of its component principles, rules, procedures and consistency between actions of the participants and these components.[32] Regardless of the fact that whether most nations respect the need for international law or whether national interest always takes precedence over international law, sustained compliance of such a regime is more reliant on self-interest than enforcement.[33] It is the self-interest of each contracting state which has led to its participation in the ECT. The key to success of any international regime is its survival when most influential players of the world are unwilling to adhere to it.

The Energy Charter Treaty has survived for over two decades now. The Treaty contributes and facilitates members of the oil and gas industry in reaching a fair and just solution to their disputes.

The Energy Charter Treaty fulfils a number of criteria outlined above to come within the ambit of an international regime. It intends to provide a long-term framework for investment and trade in energy. The focus is on a single issue, which is energy. The document of the Treaty defines its purpose and scope, provides rules and standards of behaviour to govern energy investment and trade, and sets up procedures for the arbitration of disputes.[34] The signatories of the Treaty are bound by its provisions due to the mutual benefits involved and their own self-interest. It is not only applicable to petroleum resources but also to coal and electricity; however, it has a more important role to play in the oil and gas sector.

The definitions provide for the Treaty to cover a range of tangible and intangible investments in the petroleum industry, including exploration, production, transport, distribution, and sales (Article 1).[35] The Treaty defines an investor as being a person having nationality or residence in a contracting state, or a company that is incorporated in a contracting state. Investors from a third state must have substantial business in a contracting state for an affiliate in that state to benefit from the terms of the Treaty.[36] It has been argued by Phillip Andrew-Speed that the regime for making investments is probably one of the least satisfactory components of the original Treaty because it is hedged with numerous words such as “endeavour” and “encourage.”[37] Despite this weakness, the thrust of the Treaty is to provide a non-discriminatory regime for investment in petroleum, either as national or most-favored-nation treatment, whichever is more favourable (Article 101). Disputes arising under this “pre-investment” regime may be submitted for arbitration by the signatory states, but not by the individuals or companies concerned (Article 27).[38] More importantly, the process of expropriation is also mentioned above. The IOCs can submit to arbitration under Article 26 and can choose which procedure of arbitration to adopt, with or without the consent of the host state.

The Treaty deals with a range of issues which are related to upstream and downstream petroleum. It provides security of investment to the investor and a mechanism for the IOCs to obtain compensation. It is concerned with energy efficiency as can be seen in the Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects.

The question that arises is, what are the self-interests which cause inclination among signatories of the Treaty to adhere to it? The interest of any government to take part in the Energy Charter Treaty is energy security, foreign investment and as a result, stabilised economy. The interest of IOCs or any company involved as a matter of fact is the revenue, which can be generated from upstream and downstream petroleum through exploration, production, transit and sale. Phillip Andrews-Speed has argued that these IOCs or enterprises as referred to in the article, are powerful enough to facilitate or obstruct the implementation of the Energy Charter Treaty with or without the connivance of governments. Article 22 (state and privileged enterprises) vests certain responsibilities on the signatory states in this regard. It is pertinent to mention here that a privileged enterprise for the purposes of the Treaty is any entity granted such status by the contracting state. It has also been argued that the main obstruction that has been faced previously is that these state-owned entities are keen on marking their territory, which has a consequence. By binding itself to the ECT the state has agreed to take responsibility and prevent such behaviour. Furthermore, it allows these privileged entities to enter different jurisdictions in a similar manner and without any discrimination.

The interests of the observing states and non-signatories are also of immense importance. The United States which is a key player in the oil and gas industry imported 9.4 million barrels per day from about 82 countries.[39] It was a party to the European Energy Charter initially but declined to sign due to disagreements among different states. The United States government and Western investors have a keen interest in constructing an oil and gas pipeline across Turkey in the Caspian region. In the near future, if the United States government becomes an official signatory and agrees to ratify the treaty or apply it provisionally, it could significantly benefit from the trade and transit rules provided in the ECT.

It is notable that the Energy Charter Treaty has failed to involve exporting states of the Gulf in treaty negotiations. However, many of these states have now attained the status of observers. These countries hold 65% of the world’s proven reserves of oil and 32% of the reserves of gas. There is no reason why these countries would bind themselves with a treaty which requires them to deal in a manner which may not be acceptable to them. Despite this, the Middle-Eastern states have shown interest in the Treaty which is why they have become observers in the first place. The power of OPEC has declined dramatically. The meeting in Doha, Qatar, between OPEC and non-OPEC members on April 17^th, 2016, which has been highlighted in the news occasionally, has raised a number of concerns due to the failure of involved states to reach an agreement regarding freezing output and reassuring markets. It is now being speculated that the outcome of the meeting has been so due to the absence of Iran which has now an important role to play since it has increased its oil production for the purposes of exports after the lifting of western sanctions.[40]

Global politics related to the oil and gas sector are vital elements which the ECT can benefit from. Its survival as a binding treaty is not based on the documentation, drafting or any of its key provisions. It is based on the self-interest of all states involved in the oil and gas sector. This self-interest has aligned all states to work for common interest, which has resulted in the formation of the Energy Charter Treaty. Can it be considered as a form of lex petrolea? Most certainly, and apart from having all the required characteristics of an international regime as argued by Phillip Andrew-Speed, it has imposed certain restrictions on the behavior that governs the IOC-state and state-state relationship with respect to upstream and downstream petroleum. Such restrictions have been duly accepted by some and are more likely to be accepted by the remainder in the coming years, if the politics surrounding the oil and gas sector continue to grow in the same manner as today.

Conclusion

The concept of lex petrolea has been subject to major criticism and resistance. Most of the criticism, however, is deeply anchored in the past as rightly stated by Alfredo and precisely why there is a need for globalisation of petroleum law and a unified common code. The most serious criticism comes from the supporters of traditional state positivism and conflict-of-law experts who believe that the only way to deal with international relationships is by applying conflict-of-law methods, thereby, ‘nationalizing’ international relations.[41]

The phenomenon of lex petrolea is not unique after almost 20 years from the publication of the first article. It has been recognised and is in existence. However, it is not yet fully developed or matured. The Energy Charter Treaty has a substantial role to play in the development of lex petrolea in light of the recent events and speculated decline of OPEC. It could either be considered as the basis of lex petrolea in the coming years or a common unified code could be derived on its basis. In either case, it is reasonable to suggest that, similar to the development of common law which can date back hundreds of years and considering how far it has come today, it is certain that a point may come when the powerful players of the oil and gas sector may be driven to accept lex petrolea as form of idea for a unified petroleum code.

———-

References:

[1] Reflections on the law applicable to international oil contracts by Carmen Otero Garcia-Castrillon (Journal of World Energy Law and Business, 2013, Vol 6 No. 2, Page-129)
[2] Reflections on the law applicable to international oil contracts by Carmen Otero Garcia-Castrillon (Journal of World Energy Law and Business, 2013, Vol 6 No. 2, Page-142)
[3] Lex Petrolea: sources and successes of International Petroleum Law by John Bowman http://www.energylawexchange.com/lex-petrolea-sources-successes-international-petroleum-law/
[4] Damages in International Investment Law (BIICL, 2008) – S Ripinsky with K Williams
[5] http://www.trans-lex.org/131500
[6] Thomas C.C. Child in “Update on Lex Petrolea: The continuing development of the customary law relating to international oil and gas exploration and production”.
[7]. KAHN, « Les principes généraux du droit devant les arbitres du commerce international », in Journal de droit international (Clunet), N° 2, Litec, Paris, 1989, p. 305.
[8] The Prodigious Story of the Lex Petrolea and the Rhinoceros Philosophical Aspects of the Transnational Legal Order of the Petroleum Society by Alfredo De Jesus O, Volume N-1, 2012, Transnational Petroleum Law Institute.
[9] ibid
[10] ibid
[11] Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? The 2006 Freshfields Lecture by Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Pages-12 and 13.
[12] ibid
[13] Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? The 2006 Freshfields Lecture by Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Page-22
[14] The Vienna Convention as Authority for the use of Precedent as Customary Practice in International Arbitrations of Oil Concessions and Investment Arbitrations of Oil Concessions and Investment Disputes in North Africa and the Gulf Arab States; or a lex Mercatoria for a Lex Petrolea by Mary B. Ayad, Page-24.
[15] Lex Petrolea: sources and successes of International Petroleum Law by John Bowman http://www.energylawexchange.com/lex-petrolea-sources-successes-international-petroleum-law/
[16] Lex Petrolea and the Internationalisation of Petroleum Agreements: focus on Host Government Contracts by Kim Talus, Scott Looper and Steven Otillar.
[17] The Prodigious Story of the Lex Petrolea and the Rhinoceros Philosophical Aspects of the Transnational Legal Order of the Petroleum Society by Alfredo De Jesus O, Volume N-1, 2012, Transnational Petroleum Law Institute.
[18] LLIAMCO v. Libya (1977), TOPCO v. Libya (1977) and BP v. Libya (1973)
[19] ibid
[20] An introduction to the Energy Charter Treaty by the Energy Charter Secretariat
[21] Significance of the Energy Charter Treaty by A.J.  Bradbrook
[22] ibid
[23] ibid
[24] An Introduction to the Energy Charter Treaty by the Energy Charter Secretariat
[25] ibid
[26] http://www.energycharter.org/
[27] http://www.energycharter.org/who-we-are/members-observers/
[28] An Introduction to the Energy Charter Treaty by the Energy Charter Secretariat
[29] The politics of petroleum and the Energy Charter Treaty as an effective investment regime by Philip Andrews-Speed
[30] ibid
[31] ibid
[32] ibid
[33] ibid
[34] ibid
[35] ibid
[36] Ibid
[37] ibid
[38] ibid
[39] http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=727&t=6
[40] http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/opec-oil-producers-weigh-temporary-output-cap-160417061135501.html

 

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