There was a revealing looseness in the words that revived Pakistan’s latest debate on provincial reorganisation. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi urged political parties to consider creating new administrative units or provinces to bring government closer to citizens, leaving the question of structure and nomenclature to political consensus. This made the proposal sound flexible. Constitutionally, it blurred the one distinction that cannot be left vague.
An administrative unit helps a government manage territory. A province helps govern the federation.
To minimize distances, improve coordination or to ensure equitable distribution of public services, districts and divisions can be changed. They need no legislatures, chief ministers, consolidated funds or an equal footing in the Senate. Nor do they have any role in the Council of Common Interests, the National Finance Commission, or in the institutional management of interprovincial water. A province does all these. Therefore, its creation is not merely an administrative fix, but rather a permanent redistribution of the constitutional power.
The arguments for smaller units now are well worth considering. Many administrative setups in Pakistan have grown obsolete with an ever-growing population. Most of the population from southern Punjab, interior Sindh, northern Balochistan and distant areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa make long journeys to avail the services of provincial institutions. State funds, appointments and political attention naturally flow to the provincial capitals. Smaller territories can provide governments with a more detailed knowledge of local economies, tighter supervision of departments and leadership not found in established metropolitan centres.
This is by far the strongest of the arguments, and the common counter-argument that boundaries don’t stop corruption is not the most compelling. When it comes to administration, size is significant. Yet, conferring provincial status comes with political and legal consequences that no amount of administrative efficiency can manage.
The most obvious example is the Senate. The National Assembly represents the people and the Senate was established to provide equal representation for the federating units. There are 23 Senators elected by each of the existing Provinces. If a part of one province makes two or three provinces, then that part may have several equal shares in the upper house. The lines that would be drawn up to facilitate the delivery of services would then alter the weightage at the centre between Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The issue is not merely a theoretical practice. In January 2025, the Senate Standing Committee on Law and Justice considered a bill for a South Punjab province. Senator Kamran Murtaza warned that another province would weaken the position of existing provinces, particularly Balochistan, in a chamber built on equal representation. The question was not whether South Punjab had genuine administrative grievances. It was whether their remedy could change the federal equality of everyone else.
The same problem appears beyond Parliament. Every provincial chief minister sits in the Council of Common Interests. Every provincial finance minister participates in the National Finance Commission. The Indus River System Authority consists of one member nominated by each province and one by the federal government. A new province would consequently acquire a voice not only in its own administration, but in decisions concerning shared federal-provincial matters, divisible-pool revenues and Indus waters.
Provincial status does not itself determine an equal or predetermined share of federal revenue or Indus waters. The NFC recommends financial shares under Article 160, which are then specified by presidential order; the existing Award assigns fixed percentages to the four provinces. Water allocations arise from the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord and are administered by IRSA, rather than fixed in the Constitution. A new province would therefore need an express apportionment of existing fiscal and water arrangements. It would also change participation in these institutions and could alter bargaining power beyond the new boundary.
Much of the current debate does not grasp this as well as previous legislative efforts. A constitutional amendment proposal for Bahawalpur and Janubi Punjab in 2019 was not restricted to redrawing the boundaries. It suggested enhancing the membership of the Senate from ninety-six to 142, reallocating seats in the National and provincial assemblies, creating new High Courts, and restructuring the Election Commission. It also required arrangements for water, natural resources, civil servants, employment quotas, assets, liabilities and legal rights.
Although the bill was never enacted, its architecture remains an instructive model. If a division turns into a province, all but a handful of the rooms in the constitutional house must be remodelled.
Consent cannot be treated as a technical obstacle to efficiency. Administrative efficiency alone cannot erase the deep-seated cultural, linguistic and historical identities on which our current provinces are held together. No single population formula can be enforced in provinces which have different histories, geography and political claims and a longstanding demand in southern Punjab cannot be ignored for fear of precedent in other provinces.
Article 239(4) requires any amendment altering provincial limits to secure a two-thirds majority in the affected provincial assembly, in addition to the required parliamentary majorities. That safeguard identifies who must consent, but not what provincial equality should mean after creation. Political legitimacy also requires meaningful public consultation beyond legislative arithmetic.
There is also a simpler route to much of what supporters say they want. Article 140A already requires every province to establish elected local governments and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility to them. Pakistan’s provincial governments have repeatedly accepted devolution from Islamabad while resisting it within their own borders. New provincial capitals may reproduce the same habit in practice at a shorter distance. A citizen does not experience meaningful decentralisation merely because the office withholding power has moved closer.
This does not mean that Pakistan must preserve four provinces indefinitely. New federating units may answer real demands of representation, identity and administrative neglect. But the country must first decide whether it seeks better local government or a new federal settlement. The first requires protected local institutions, regular provincial finance commission awards and authority below the provincial capital. The second requires agreement on Senate equality, the CCI, the NFC, water governance, courts, services, assets, liabilities and public consent.
A federal reorganisation commission may help, provided its mandate begins with these constitutional choices rather than a preferred number of provinces. Economic viability and administrative accessibility matter. So do history, identity and democratic consent. None can be reduced to predetermined boundaries and presented as politically neutral.
Pakistan may eventually redraw its map. It should not do so while pretending that the labels are interchangeable. Administrative units deliver government. Provinces share power in the federation. Whatever we call them, the Constitution will know the difference.
References
- Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, particularly Articles 51, 59, 140A, 153–154, 160, 198 and 239, Fourteenth Edition, National Assembly of Pakistan, as amended up to November 21, 2025.
https://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/6926e060076ed_467.pdf - BR Web Desk. “Naqvi Calls for New Administrative Units, Political Consensus to Fix Governance System.” Business Recorder, July 30, 2026.
https://www.brecorder.com/news/40432570/naqvi-calls-for-new-administrative-units-political-consensus-to-fix-governance-system - Senate of Pakistan. “Purpose & Role.”
https://www.senate.gov.pk/en/essence.php?catid=4&cattitle=0&id=1102&leftcatid=269&subcatid=138 - Senate of Pakistan. “Composition / Structure.”
https://www.senate.gov.pk/en/essence.php?catid=4&cattitle=About&id=10&leftcatid=125&subcatid=138 - Senate of Pakistan. “Senate Standing Committee on Law and Justice Meeting Concerning the Proposed South Punjab Province.” Official news release, January 8, 2025.
https://www.senate.gov.pk/en/news_content.php?id=NTgxNQ%3D%3D - Council of Common Interests Secretariat. Annual Report 2021–22. Government of Pakistan.
https://cci.gov.pk/SiteImage/Misc/files/Annual%20Reports/Annual%20Report%202021-22.pdf - Finance Division, Government of Pakistan. “Constitution of the National Finance Commission.”
https://www.finance.gov.pk/nfc_cons.html - Government of Pakistan. Distribution of Revenues and Grants-in-Aid Order, 2010, President’s Order No. 5 of 2010, reproduced in Finance Division, Budget in Brief 2011–12. https://www.finance.gov.pk/budget/budgetinbrief_2011_12.pdf
- Government of Pakistan. Water Apportionment Accord, 1991.
https://pakirsa.gov.pk/WAA.aspx - Government of Pakistan. The Indus River System Authority Act, 1992, Act No. XXII of 1992, section 3.
https://pakirsa.gov.pk/LegalProceedings.aspx - National Assembly Secretariat. Report of the Standing Committee on Law and Justice on the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 2019, concerning the proposed provinces of Bahawalpur and Janubi Punjab.
https://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1578570733_383.pdf - “Redrawing the Problem?” Business Recorder, August 4, 2026.
https://www.brecorder.com/news/40433131/redrawing-the-problem
