May 2025 saw South Asia experience one of its worst military crises in recent years. Between May 7 and May 10, the two nuclear-armed nations engaged in cycles of air, drone, and missile strikes, damaging each other’s defence installations, communication tools, and main cities. Since the 1971 war, it was the first time that Indian missiles struck Pakistan’s Punjab region. Consequently, Pakistani missiles retaliated by hitting Indian military bases located in Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Jammu and Kashmir. Such actions brought about consequences away from the battlefield. Those living along the Line of Control (LoC) were forced to move away from their homes, the necessary infrastructure was ruined, and the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) and the Simla Agreement came close to collapse.
The series of attacks began after 26 Hindu tourists were killed in Pahalgam, a place in Indian-administered Kashmir, on April 22. The incident occurred near the Line of Control, which is the border that divides Kashmir between India and Pakistan. Narendra Modi firmly expressed his disapproval of the attack and said those involved would be held accountable. The Resistance Front (TRF) announced its involvement in the attack. TRF was established by the original Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which organised the devastating 2008 Mumbai attacks that were one of India’s most severe attacks in history. Consequently, ties between the two nations were downgraded, Pakistani military personnel were withdrawn, and all trade was stopped. This led to the first time in history that IWT was suspended. Therefore, Pakistan cancelled the Simla Agreement, which is the basis for accepting the LoC. Such actions went beyond routine procedures and revealed a concerning readiness to abandon key legal tools meant to settle disputes between the countries.
India’s Operation Sindoor, launched on May 7, aimed at what it referred to as terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Missiles struck six locations, including Muridke and Bahawalpur. India claimed these cities were home to the headquarters of groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. The strikes were framed by India as limited, proportionate, and focused on counter-terrorism objectives. However, Pakistan reported civilian casualties and alleged that Indian forces had targeted mosques and hydro-infrastructure, including the Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project.
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan stated that the casualties of the Indian air strikes were ‘a grave violation of international human rights law and could constitute crimes against humanity’. There is little doubt that the legality of India’s military strikes is contested, particularly regarding the attribution of the Pahalgam attack to Pakistan as a state actor.
In retaliation, Pakistan launched drones against fifteen Indian military bases. In the following days, both countries exchanged intense aerial fire, with each side claiming successful intercepts and heavy losses inflicted on the other. On May 9, Pakistan’s military stated it had neutralised seventy-seven Israeli-origin drones used by India. Simultaneously, Pakistan launched ‘Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos’, hitting Indian targets such as airbases at Udhampur, Pathankot, Suratgarh, and Sirsa, and destroying a BrahMos missile storage site in Beas. The military intensity of the conflict had surpassed even the Kargil War of 1999.
India asserted that it validated a new counter-terrorism doctrine. Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that nuclear threats would no longer deter Indian action, stating, ‘India will strike precisely and decisively at the terrorist hideouts that operate under the cover of nuclear blackmail’. Indian strategists promoted the campaign as a demonstration of escalation dominance, claiming that India could dictate the terms of any future conflict.
Contrastingly, Pakistan presented a markedly different narrative. Islamabad framed its retaliation as a lawful act of self-defence, emphasising adherence to international law and the principles of proportionality. Army Chief General Asim Munir, addressing the nation, portrayed the firm response as a means of protecting national sovereignty and ensuring regional stability. He criticised India’s aggression and baseless accusations, asserting that Pakistan responded with maturity, restraint, and moral clarity despite Indian hostility. Former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari denied any state role in the Pahalgam attack and criticised India for unilateral aggression, calling for an impartial UN inquiry.
Pakistan’s government highlighted the involvement of external mediators; Pakistani officials welcomed U.S. and other third-party engagement to end the conflict, arguing this showed the Kashmir dispute could no longer be kept bilateral. Indeed, analysts note Pakistan succeeded in ‘internationalising’ Kashmir. Walter Ladwig of King’s College London stated that Islamabad ‘welcomed mediation from a range of countries, including the US, framing the ceasefire as evidence of the need for external involvement’. In parliament and public statements, Pakistan threatened to suspend participation in the Simla Accord if India did not desist from territorial incursions – essentially repudiating the 1972 framework that commits both sides to ‘bilateral negotiations’ only.
Despite the risks, neither government was willing to de-escalate without external pressure. It was only after sustained diplomatic engagement by the United States, along with behind-the-scenes efforts from the UK, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, that a ceasefire was brokered on May 10. US President Donald Trump announced the truce, which was later confirmed by both governments. Air traffic resumed, and hostilities ceased, but the conflict left behind shattered treaties, frayed nerves, and an even deeper political deadlock.
In the aftermath of the conflict, both sides presented dramatically different assessments of the outcome. India claimed that it had redefined the rules of engagement and demonstrated its military superiority. In contrast, Pakistan asserted that it had protected its sovereignty, successfully penetrated Indian territory for the first time, and restored parity by involving international actors. Currently, India maintains the precondition that future discussions will focus solely on terrorism and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Meanwhile, Pakistan is seeking broader international mediation and is already participating in Track 1.5 dialogues with Indian counterparts through third-party countries.
This war changed the military and legal aspects of India-Pakistan relations. Since the Indus Waters Treaty and the Simla Agreement are becoming weaker, it seems future crises may lack the necessary protections that helped stabilise the region for many years. The rhetoric surrounding water wars, nuclear options, and the unilateral abrogation of treaties creates a volatile situation that the international legal community can no longer afford to overlook.
Sovereignty disputes and standing conflicts in South Asia have long existed, but the incident in May 2025 proves that political opportunism and nationalistic wars can lead to a quick collapse of existing laws. Now that the conflict is over, there is still one unanswered question: can there ever be lasting peace between the two neighbours without strong legal ties and mutual awareness of limits?
The May 2025 India–Pakistan clashes underscored both the dangers and constraints of the rivalry. Each side can now strike deeper, faster, and with fewer immediate barriers than before. However, both have also demonstrated some restraint: there was no formal war declaration, no nuclear exchange, and both leaderships ultimately heeded international calls to de-escalate. The crisis also highlighted the fragility of existing legal frameworks: water sharing, ceasefire accords, and counter-terror conventions were all invoked or breached. Going forward, the only certainty is that such crises will recur unless durable political solutions or confidence-building measures are found. In the meantime, both states have signalled that some past taboo actions (targeting strategic depth, using new weapons) may now be considered part of the ‘new normal’ – a shift with profound implications for regional security and international law.
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