The debate over the “Basic Structure” of the Constitution of Pakistan resurfaces after every major constitutional amendment. The theory suggests that certain core features of a constitution cannot be altered. However, unlike India, Pakistan does not recognize any Basic Structure Doctrine. The Supreme Court has consistently held that Parliament possesses plenary authority to amend the Constitution under Articles 238 and 239, and that courts are barred from striking down constitutional amendments. Pakistan’s Constitution is viewed as a living document, designed to evolve with societal needs.
The discussion began with attempts to treat the Objectives Resolution as a “grundnorm” in cases such as Asma Jillani and State v. Zia-ur-Rahman, but the Supreme Court repeatedly refused to give it superiority over the Constitution. Although the Resolution was later inserted as Article 2A, the Court—most notably in Hakim Khan—reaffirmed that it cannot invalidate other constitutional provisions. Judicial consensus remains that constitutional amendment is exclusively parliament’s function, while courts are confined to ensuring legality in ordinary legislation and executive actions – the power of Judicial Review.
In Al-Jehad Trust and related cases, the Supreme Court reiterated that no constitutional provision can be struck down, even if inconsistent with another; such inconsistencies fall within the competence of Parliament. Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Abrar Hassan, argues that Articles 238 and 239 reflect a deliberate separation of powers, assigning amendment authority solely to the Legislature.
In the Rawalpindi District Bar Association (21st Amendment) case, petitioners relied on the Basic Structure Theory to challenge military courts. The Court once again rejected the doctrine, reaffirming that neither the Objectives Resolution nor the Preamble has overriding power. In Mahmood Khan Achakzai and Pakistan Lawyers Forum, the Court recognized certain “salient features” (federalism, parliamentary democracy, Islamic provisions) but emphasized that these cannot be used to invalidate constitutional amendments, and Pakistan does not follow India’s Kesavananda Bharati precedent.
Justice Saqib Nisar underscored that the amendment power lies with elected representatives, not unelected judges. While some judges, such as Justice Qazi Faez Isa, identified the historical roots of the Basic Structure concept in the Objectives Resolution, even this view does not support striking down constitutional provisions. Overall, Pakistan’s jurisprudence remains consistent: Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution is supreme, and courts cannot nullify amendments. The 18th Amendment case further reflected this approach, as the Supreme Court did not strike it down but recommended reconsideration, leading to the 19th Amendment.
Judicial review remains available only for ordinary legislation and executive actions. Even in upholding military courts due to extraordinary security conditions, the Supreme Court emphasized that judicial review—for mala fide, coram non judice, or procedural violations—remains intact, including protections under Article 10A. The Supreme Court has also clarified the status of the Objectives Resolution and Article 2A. As Chief Justice Nasir ul Mulk and earlier cases held, the Resolution guides interpretation where language is ambiguous, but is not a supra-constitutional instrument. It cannot override clear constitutional text. Earlier High Court attempts to treat it as a grundnorm were explicitly rejected.
Thus, Pakistan’s jurisprudence establishes that:
• No Basic Structure Doctrine limits Parliament.
• The Preamble/Article 2A cannot nullify constitutional provisions.
• Amending power rests with Parliament, not the judiciary.
• Judicial review applies only to ordinary laws, not amendments.
Turning to the 26th and 27th Amendments, questions arise about the legitimacy of the Parliament that enacted them. This Parliament was widely disputed, and its representative character questioned due to allegations of vote manipulation, the deprivation of a major political party’s electoral symbol – thanks to Justice Qazi Faez Isa; and the alteration of results through manipulated Forms 45 and 47—practices allegedly facilitated by the Election Commission. Such controversies raise a critical constitutional question: Can a Parliament whose legitimacy is contested amend the Constitution in ways that impact the independence of the judiciary?
A further analytical concern is whether Pakistan’s Parliament is truly “omnipotent” like the UK Parliament—famously described as able to “make a man a woman”—or whether, as an Islamic Republic governed by a written Constitution, its powers are inherently more limited. These issues lie at the heart of Pakistan’s ongoing struggle for democratic credibility, constitutional balance, and institutional legitimacy.
