Introduction

It has, unfortunately, been the case in Pakistan that democracy has rarely been given sufficient time to develop into the institutional structure it was meant to become. Repeated coups have eroded public trust and weakened the separation of powers to such an extent that, at certain moments, resistance has appeared almost inevitable. A clear illustration is the Lawyers’ Movement. When the judiciary’s independence was curtailed and judges were pressured and removed, the reaction did not arise out of nowhere. Lawyers mobilized across the country and ultimately succeeded in restoring the Chief Justice.

Yet an underlying problem often goes unnoticed. After his restoration, the Chief Justice presided over an unprecedented number of suo-motu proceedings. A form of principled constitutionalism began to dominate the Court’s approach, and the judiciary increasingly came to be identified with the personality of the Chief Justice, often referred to as Chaudhry’s Court^[1]. In this context, a case worth considering is Sindh High Court Bar Association (SHBA) v. Federation of Pakistan, which reflects the judiciary’s expanding role in Pakistan’s constitutional and political landscape. SHBA overturned previous Supreme Court case and critiqued major constitutional cases. The case in question is Tikka Iqbal Muhammad^[2] which validated the coup of General Pervez Musharraf on grounds of state necessity and Salus populi suprema lex^[3]. SHBA put forward these points:

1. The Court declared the Proclamation of Emergency, the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) No. 1 of 2007, and the Oath of Office (Judges) Order as unconstitutional, illegal, and void ab initio.
2. The appointment of Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar as Chief Justice was declared void ab initio because the office of the Chief Justice never legally fell vacant. Consequently, all judicial appointments made in consultation with him between November 3, 2007, and March 22, 2009, were also ruled unconstitutional and of no legal effect
3. The Court firmly rejected the Doctrine of State Necessity and the maxim salus populi est suprema lex, which had historically been used to justify military takeovers. The Court explicitly stated that these doctrines absolutely have no application to an unconstitutional assumption of power by an authority not mentioned in the Constitution.

How the Lawyers’ Movement Reshaped the SHCBA Verdict

As said in the preface as well, such a form of oppression, at times, causes resistance of such a magnitude that it gets difficult to control it. Iftikhar Chaudhry retained his position as the judge of the Balochistan High Court by taking an oath under the under the Provisional Constitutional Order issued by General Musharraf. This step was viewed as his alignment with the military establishment. Subsequently, he was elevated to the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 2002 and was made the Chief Justice in 2005. He was known for his hasty^[4] pace in handling the mounting backlog of cases in the Supreme Court. Until the decision in the Steel Mills case, there were no clear indications of a challenge to the Musharraf regime from the judiciary. 

After the steel mill case, he was dismissed by Gen. Musharraf from the SC. His termination led to protests all across the country. What was more blatant was the way his termination took place. He was called on 9^th March 2007 to the President’s camp office by Musharraf and was asked to step down in light of the allegations made by the lawyer Naeem Bukhari in his letter. At around 5 p.m., television broadcasts showed Justice Javed Iqbal being sworn in as Acting Chief Justice, while Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, by then suspended, was seen leaving the Camp Office. Two presidential orders had been issued: one suspending the Chief Justice indefinitely and another appointing Justice Javed Iqbal as Acting Chief Justice; however, both were published in the official Gazette only three days later. At the time, Justice Rana Bhagwandas, the next most senior judge after Chief Justice Chaudhry, was abroad on an official visit to India, and therefore Justice Javed Iqbal, being next in line, assumed the position. What followed was the decision of the Supreme Judicial Council and Iftikhar Chaudry’ house arrest.

While the reinstatement of the ousted Chief Justice was widely celebrated as a popular victory, public support alone does not fully explain the outcome. Behind the scenes, the decision was shaped by subtle yet decisive pressure from the military establishment. Reports from individuals close to power suggested that the possibility of a coup was being actively signalled. Troops appeared conspicuously on the streets, projecting authority, while key political allies began to withdraw their support. Confronted with growing uncertainty and the risk of governmental collapse, the president ultimately relented, clearing the way for the Chief Justice’s dramatic return.

On 24 March 2009, Iftikhar Chaudhry became once again the de facto and de jure Chief Justice of Pakistan.^[5] The restoration of judges was made without oath, just a notification was made. After its restoration, the Supreme Court initially acted cautiously to maintain political equilibrium^[6], gradually dismantling the legal legacy of the emergency. It first nullified the Dogar Court’s ruling in Tikka Iqbal Muhammad Khan, declaring General Musharraf’s imposition of emergency unconstitutional. In SHCBA the Court ruled that the PCO was illegal and unconstitutional. The judgment was a statement by the judiciary about its past history and its new role and legitimacy. The Court went through a detailed history of the judgments, upholding military usurpations of power on the grounds of the doctrine of necessity before rejecting the doctrine of necessity as a justification for extra-constitutional interventions. 

The Court ousted all the judges who had been appointed between Justice Chaudhry’s suspension in 2007 and restoration in 2009. With many new judges to appoint, Chaudhry’s primary criterion was loyalty. As one senior lawyer explained, ‘after the PCO, loyalty to the Lawyers’ Movement was the sole criterion for appointment. [Movement] lawyers as they were called were selected.’ Only those judges were appointed that had an active role in the lawyer’ movement. As one lawyer said, ‘today the judiciary in Lahore is 60 per cent under the control of the bar.’^[7]  

An Appraisal of SHCBA v. Federation and its Historical Antecedents

1) No notices were served to the parties concerned:

To begin with the court didn’t issue notices to the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts who made the Oath in violation of the order of the 3^rd November, 2007, and the judges who were appointed by then C.J Abdul Hameed Dogar. Rule 9 of the Order XXV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980^[8] reads as under:

“The notice shall be served on all persons directly affected and on such other persons as the court may direct.”

Nearly 106 judges^[9] of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and High courts were affected by the judgement. Many permanent judges were removed from the court and were even issued notices of contempt. The court relied on many cases to justify the non-issuance of the notices to the judges. The court held that as regards the question of notices we are of the considered view that issuance of notices to the concerned Judges will do more harm than good.¹¹ The court relied on Al-Jehad Trust, Ghulam Hyder Lakho v. Federation of Pakistan and many.^[10]  

In this regard it would be important to look at the brief facts of the cases mentioned.

a) A Departure from Precedents

      I)         Al-Jehad Trust vs The Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324):

In the said case the appointments of some additional judges in the high courts were challenged. The main concern was that the judges were not appointed in consultation with the Chief justice as per the procedure mentioned in article 191 of the constitution. It was stated that the consultation with the acting^[11] Chief Justice won’t be deemed as a consultation with the chief justice. It must be noted that the grievance in the instant case was that certain judges were appointed in the High Court with consultation with the CJ Dogar, whereas in the precedent case, the grievance was that some judges were appointed in consultation with the acting CJ. In instant case such appointments were said to be void ab initio and unconstitutional, while in the precedent case, the appointments were said to be reviewed by the incumbent Chief Justices of the High Courts. The court in the precedent case expressed its opinion as such:

“We are leaving it open that the appointments made with the “recommendations” of Acting Chief Justices in the High Court can be reviewed and steps can be taken by the permanent Chief Justice to “regularise” them if this can be done on the basis of merit.” 

Moreover, two examples are relevant to mention.¹⁴ Firstly, Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry vs. the president of Pakistan.^[12] In the said case a Reference was filed against Iftikhar Chaudhry by the Federal Government before the Supreme Judicial Council under Article 209 of the Constitution. After first hearing, the Chief Justice was restrained from performing his functions. Later declared unconstitutional and illegal by a thirteen member bench. According to the Court, no such restraining order could be passed without notice. The words are reproduced as below:

“That the said order which stripped the head of the National Judiciary of all his powers had been passed without hearing him; without any notice to him for the said purpose and was not an ad-interim order which was to inure only till the next date of hearing but was an order which was to remain in force through the entire length of the proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council i.e. till the reference was finally answered by it.”

Para 148 of the same judgement states:

“It was an order passed without notice to the petitioner- CJP, was not just an interim order which was subject to notice but was a final and an absolute order which was to continue till as long as the proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council lasted. Such, then being the manner in which such an unprecedented order had been passed, the same could not be sustained as a valid exercise of judicial or even the quasi judicial powers.”

The affected judges were barred from their duties without notice or formal orders. Despite repeated written and oral requests, their respective Chief Justices refused to assign them to the roster, effectively restraining them from functioning without any official process.

In the above context, Para-132 states:

“Having thus surveyed the Constitutional Scheme of our country vis- à-vis the removal of Judges of Supreme Court or of any of the High Courts, the conclusion is irresistible that our Constitution does not allow any restraint on the exercise of judicial powers by a Judge or any restraint on him to act as a Judge during the pendency of the proceedings envisaged by Article 209 of the Constitution nor has our Constitution authorized any subordinate legislation for the said purpose.”  

The ruling in Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of Pakistan establishes that no authority, including the President, has the constitutional power to render a judge dysfunctional. Neither the Constitution nor subordinate legislation (such as the Contempt of Court Act or Ordinance) permits restraining a judge from their duties while proceedings are pending.Moreover, the security and tenure of the judges is declared critical for the independence of the judiciary.^[13] 

While that case famously saw the Chief Justice sidelined by the President and the Supreme Judicial Council, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled such actions unlawful. Despite this clear legal precedent, the judges in the current case were similarly incapacitated in total defiance of these established findings.

      II)       Mr. Justice Ghulam Haider Lakho vs. Federation of Pakistan:^[14]

The second case relied for not sending notices was Mr. Justice Ghulam Haider Lakho vs. Federation of Pakistan. A close analysis clearly indicates the difference between two. The petitioners in the said case, 11 former judges of the Lahore, Sindh, and Peshawar High Courts^[15], filed petitions to challenge their removal from offices in light of the direction of the Supreme Court. The court reiterated the principle laid down in Al-Jehad.

On page 192 of the judgement:

“That in terms of the short order of the court, the respective Chief Justices of the High Courts were required to process the cases of the only recent appointed judges for regularizing and, therefore, this process couldn’t be extended to de-confirm or nullify the appointments of the judges; that the petitioners were de-confirmed or the appointments were nullified by the government  without hearing them and as such the actions nullified their appointment as  judges of the High Court offended against the principles of natural justice.”

The court’s response to this was simple. The judges weren’t treated as sitting¹⁹ judges rather as candidates. The court held further:

“In these circumstances, we are inclined to hold that where the chief justices of the High Court concerned and the chief justice of Pakistan do not recommend a particular incumbent for the confirmation or appointment as the judge of the high court and these recommendations are accepted by president and chief executive, the same cannot be brought under challenge before the court on the ground that the incumbent was not heard before making such recommendations.”

The judges removed by court in SHCBA were not appointed by an acting CJ. Even if we were to not take Abdul Hameed Dogar as a valid CJ, atleast there should have been a process or the cases should have been sent to an authority to assess, or, let’s humor that idea, the court should have viewed it. Itself.

2) The case of beneficiary bench:

The main judgement has been authored CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry where he declared himself as the incumbent constitutional Chief Justice, while declaring the appointment of J. Dogar unconstitutional. This stands contrary to the practice of judges not sitting in the benches where their own interest in involved. The court in the instant judgement itself criticized Tikka Iqbal Khan on the same ground while referring to the arguments brought forward by the petitioners:

“It is respectfully submitted, that Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar could not be treated as Constitutional head of the Supreme Court even after the decision in the case of Tika Iqbal Khan (supra) as he himself was the real beneficiary of the said Judgment and contrary to one of the cardinal principles of Natural justice, “no person should be judge in his own cause” had headed the Bench. Hence, in view of the facts and reasons stated above Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry is still the Chief Justice of Pakistan as per Constitution and all appointments and reappointments made in the Supreme Court and High Courts without consultation of de jure Chief justice of Pakistan are unlawful, illegal, ultra vires of the Constitution as well as mala fide”.^[16]

Another example in this regard would be Malik Asad Ali vs Federation of Pakistan:^[17]

“Out of the 17 Judges of this Court which constituted Full Court, Mr. Justice Sajjad Ali Shah could not sit on the Bench as he is one of the respondents in these cases. The next senior Judge Mr. Justice Ajmal Mian declined to sit on the Bench as he was of the view that his personal interest is involved in the cases.”

While, yes, courts do prescribe to the doctrine that judges are keepers of their own conscience, judicial impartiality is not limited to the absence of actual bias; it extends equally to the appearance of impartiality. Where a reasonable observer may apprehend that a bench stands to benefit institutionally or structurally from the outcome of a case, constitutional legitimacy is threatened.

3) The doctrine of state necessity:

The court did not find the doctrine of state necessity to be applicable and held that the facts and circumstances are very different as were in Begum Nusrat Bhutto^[18] and Zafar Ali Shah^[19] case. The court, as said above as well, rejected the reliance upon this doctrine by the court in Tikka Iqbal

Khan. Pakistan’s superior courts had previously accepted the dominance of executive power. It would be important, at this instance, to take a stroll down the history lane.  

a) Usif Patel v. The Crown

Following the Tamizuddin Khan ruling, forty-six statutes were struck down because they lacked the Governor-General’s formal assent. In a bid to rectify this, the Governor-General attempted to use emergency decrees to unilaterally validate the voided laws. However, in Usif Patel v The Crown²⁴, the Federal Court checked this expansion of authority, ruling that the Governor-General lacked the power to amend the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the Constituent Assembly remained an essential part of the law-making process that could not be bypassed. 

b) Governor-General’s Reference

The legal vacuum created by the Usif Patel decision forced Governor-General Ghulam

Muhammad to invoke the Federal Court’s advisory jurisdiction through Special Reference No. 1 of 1955^[20]. This Reference became the birthplace of the Doctrine of Necessity in Pakistan. The

Governor-General sought the Court’s opinion on two critical issues: how to revalidate the laws struck down after the Tamizuddin Khan case and whether his dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was lawful.

On the issue of legislation, the Court initially affirmed that only a legislative body could validate laws. However, it then carved out an exception, ruling that under the “common law of civil or state necessity,” the Governor-General could temporarily validate the forty-six invalidated laws to prevent a total collapse of the legal order. This allowed the laws to be treated as if they had been valid since their inception, pending future legislative approval.

Regarding the dissolution of the Assembly, the Court validated the Governor-General’s actions. It reasoned that the original Assembly had lost its representative character and had essentially turned into a perpetual legislature that was no longer accountable to the public. Consequently, the Court recognized the Constituent Convention, a hybrid body of elected and nominated members—as a legitimate replacement capable of exercising constitutional powers.

Justice Cornelius argued that while the power to dissolve the Assembly existed under precedent, the law provided no mechanism for the executive to validate statutes via emergency powers. He instead suggested a procedural stay of court actions until the new Convention could act legally.  c) The mirroring three:

The Dosso,^[21] Nusrat Bhutto,^[22] and Zafar Ali Shah²⁸ cases are associated with the three major martial laws in Pakistan’s history, the military coups of Ayub Khan, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf respectively. All three cases were decided in favour of the military rulers.  

In Dosso, Mohammad Munir CJ held that “a victorious revolution or a successful coup d’etat is an internationally recognized method of changing a constitution.” That is to say that once the character has been changed, the new legal order must rely on the new law-creating organ^[23]. Thus:

“Where a revolution is successful it satisfies the test of efficacy and becomes a basic law-creating fact. On that assumption the Law (Continuance in Force) Order, however transitory or imperfect, was a new legal Order and it was in accordance with that Order that the validity of the law and the correctness of judicial decisions had to be determined.”

Resultantly, Ayub Khan ruled. 

In Nusrat Bhutto, it was said by the state that the “stage of collapse is slowly being brought back to normalcy; Government institutions which were on the verge of disintegration are being restored to health, and the country’s foreign policy is being conducted in the national interest and not for the aggrandizement of Mr. Bhutto or the projection of his personal image.”^[24] 

What intriguing is that the Attorney General “supported the submissions made by the Counsel for the Federation and added that the change did not amount to usurpation of State power by the Chief of Army Staff, but was in fact intended to oust the usurper who had illegally assumed power as a result of massive rigging of the elections.”^[25] The court held that the Chief Martial Law Administrator, having validly assumed power by means of an extra-constitutional step, in the interest of the state and the welfare of the people, is entitled to perform all such acts and promulgate all legislative measure which have been consistently recognized by judicial authorities as falling within the law of necessity. S. Anwar ul Haq, CJ held in his judgment that: 

“It seems to me, therefore, that on facts, of which we have taken judicial notice, namely; that the imposition of Martial Law was impelled by high considerations of State Necessity and welfare of the people, the extra constitutional step taken up by the Chief of the Army Staff to over throw the Government of Mr. Z. A. as well as the Provincial Legislatures stands validated in accordance with the doctrine of necessity.”^[26]

Three decades later, the 2000 Zafar Ali Shah case essentially replayed the legal theater of the Nusrat Bhutto case, changing little more than the dates and the names of the protagonists. In this instance, General Pervez Musharraf secured judicial approval for his unconstitutional seizure of power by first reshaping the court’s composition to ensure a sympathetic bench. Once again, the judiciary invoked the doctrine of necessity to legitimize a military coup, granting the dictator broad authority to bypass and amend the Constitution at will.

While the legal reasoning remained largely identical, the two cases differed in the license granted to the military: whereas the court in Nusrat Bhutto had been promised elections within ninety days by General Zia, the Zafar Ali Shah verdict accepted Musharraf’s significantly longer three-year timeline for a return to democracy. 

The petitions against the military takeover and for the restoration Bench of 12 judges of the Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice Irshad Hassan Khan. After months of hearing, judgment was announced as 12 May 2000 disposing of all the petitions with the following findings:

By October 12, 1999, the political environment had deteriorated into a crisis for which the 1973 Constitution offered no viable remedy, rendering a military intervention an unavoidable “extraconstitutional” necessity. To justify this takeover, the Federal Government submitted substantial evidence and corroborative materials to the court, arguing that the collapse of civilian order left no other option. Consequently, the judiciary validated the coup by invoking the Doctrine of State Necessity and the legal maxim salus populi suprema lex relying on the same legal framework established decades earlier in the Begum Nusrat Bhutto case.^[27] Moreover, the arbitrary removal of Gen Musharraf was said to be ab initio void and of no legal effect.

In time, Supreme Court justices who legitimized successive martial laws would come under fire. As Supreme Court Justice Dorab Patelremarked, ‘How do you expect five men alone, unsupported by anyone, to declare martial law illegal?’

4) SHCBA: Breaking the Deja-vu?

As said earlier, the court in SHCBA refused to accept these judgements, or rather refused to accept the doctrine that has been established due to differing circumstances. 

“Was it a reality that the Constitution had become unworkable each time? Were the situations on 7th October, 1958, 25th March, 1969, 5th July, 1977, 12th October, 1999 and 3rd November, 2007 really such that the Constitution provided no solution? Do similar situations not arise in other countries? Are there no protests, rallies, agitations, riots, loss of human life, etc. in other countries? Is there no corruption in the other countries? Are there no deficiencies or inefficiencies in the working of different departments and organizations in other countries? Are there no conflicts or differences of opinion among the various stakeholders of different organs of the State? Does rigging in elections not take place in other countries? What was the wrong with the judiciary in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999? Why were the Judges given new oaths each time and not allowed to perform their functions under the Constitution? Why the elected leaders were not allowed to complete their term and why the judgment over their performance not left to the electorate to whom they would be answerable?”^[28]

Mentioning then CJ Anwarul Haq the court held that:

“Anwarul Haq, CJ, validated the action of 5th July, 1977 applying the doctrine of necessity, the other pre-requisites of which were that the measure taken must be proportionate to the necessity and it must be of a temporary character limited to the duration of the exceptional circumstances. Was the action of 5th July 1977 proportionate to the necessity, was it of a temporary character, and was it limited to the duration of the exceptional circumstances were the questions never considered by the learned Chief Justice”^[29]

This stands in clear contradiction to the short order passed by the Supreme Court during the proceedings of the 18^th Amendment Act. A Full Court bench of the Supreme Court ordered 32 additional High Court judges to continue their duties past their scheduled terms to prevent a “judicial void” and systemic collapse.^[30] 

The reason for the above order, which is patently against the provisions of the Constitution and case law on the subject, was given as below:-

“The non-appointment of additional judges on completion of one year is likely to give rise of constitutional complications in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.”^[31]

Consequently, this exceptional order was issued primarily to prevent potential “constitutional complications” within two of Pakistan’s provinces. It is notable, however, that while Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry utilized this reasoning here, he had previously rejected similar justifications when they were offered by his predecessors. Specifically, in Paragraph 104 of the current judgment, Chief Justice Chaudhry expressed his explicit disagreement with the perspective of former Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq, who had justified judicial concessions in the Begum Nusrat Bhutto case by stating:

“It was a striking example of the invocation of the law of necessity to validate certain extraconstitutional measures dictated by the considerations of the welfare of the people and the avoidance of a legal vacuum.”^[32]

One would wonder what difference would there be between avoidance of ‘legal vacuum’ and avoidance of ‘constitutional complications’? The appointment of judges is an executive function of the President as held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan itself. There is no provision which empowers the Supreme Court of Pakistan to appoint additional judges of high courts or extend their tenure.

Moreover, the learned Chief Justice in the instant case disapproved the judgment rendered by former Chief Justice Anwaar-ul-Haq in Nusrat Bhutto case, particularly on ground of doctrine of state necessity. Similarly, the former Chief Justice refused to accept justification of acts of General Pervez Musharraf which he took on 3rd November, 2007, on ground of the above. Furthermore, the Chief Justice notably omitted any discussion regarding the legal basis upon which the Supreme Court had previously validated General Pervez Musharraf’s October 12, 1999, takeover. This justification was rooted in the very same doctrine.

Conclusion:

Sindh High Court Bar Association vs The Federation of Pakistan is a judgement, it is difficult to contest, quite a few of us would disagree with, in regards to the outcome intended. The assumption of power by a military dictator is wrong in all cases and the court should not stand behind, but it would be very profoundly ironical, if the court, on its way to dismantle a coup, inadvertently staged a constitutional one of its own. This is not to say that Sindh High Court Bar Association is a judgement that renders from despotic times, it is a judgement that, on its surface, purports to be the very instrument of its ending. The danger which the current decision must face is precisely this formal similarity, that a court which is operating in the name of constitutional restoration, may, by the breadth of its action, be involved in the self-inflation of the very impulse it is attempting to curb. Method and outcome cannot be so conveniently divided out of each other in constitutional law, at least.

---

[1] Moeen H. Cheema, The “Chaudhry Court”: Deconstructing the “Judicialization of Politics” in    Pakistan, 25 Wash. Int’l L.J. 447 (2016). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol25/iss3/4

[2] PLD 2008 SC 6

[3] The welfare of the people is the supreme law.

[4] Hamid Khan, A History of the Judiciary in Pakistan(Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 471.

[5] Moeen H Cheema, Courting Constitutionalism: The Politics of Judicial Review in Pakistan (PhD thesis, Australian National University 2018) 236.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Yasser Kureshi, Seeking Supremacy: The Pursuit of Judicial Power in Pakistan (Cambridge University Press 2022)

[8] https://scp.gov.pk/files/Misc/The_Pakistan_Supreme_Court_Rules.pdf

[9] Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi, The Judgment, 2009: An Appraisal & Fair Comments on Sindh

High Court Bar Association vs. Federation of Pakistan: (PLD 2009 SC 879) (Key Law Report Publications 2015) 35 ¹¹ PLD 2009 SC 879, 215

[10] Ibid.

[11] Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi, The Judgment, 2009: An Appraisal & Fair Comments on Sindh

High Court Bar Association vs. Federation of Pakistan: (PLD 2009 SC 879) (Key Law Report Publications 2015) 36 ¹⁴ Ibid, 41.

[12] PLD 2010 SC 61

[13] Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi, The Judgment, 2009: An Appraisal & Fair Comments on Sindh

High Court Bar Association vs. Federation of Pakistan: (PLD 2009 SC 879) (Key Law Report Publications 2015) 75

[14] PLD 2000 SC 179

[15] Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi, The Judgment, 2009: An Appraisal & Fair Comments on Sindh

High Court Bar Association vs. Federation of Pakistan: (PLD 2009 SC 879) (Key Law Report Publications 2015) 44 ¹⁹ Ibid 48.

[16] PLD 2009 SC 879, 60

[17] PLD 1998 SC 161

[18] PLD 1977 SC 657

[19] PLD 2000 SC 869 ²⁴ PLD 1955 FC 387.

[20] PLD 1955 FC 435

[21] PLD 1958 SC 533.

[22] PLD 1977 SC 657. ²⁸ PLD 2000 SC 869.

[23] Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (1st edn, OUP 2001) 128

[24] PLD 1977 SC 657. 673

[25] Abrar Hassan, Constitutional and Extra Constitutional Martial Law, Emergency Decision by Superior Courts of Pakistan, Asia Law House, 272.

[26] Uzma Zahoor, ‘Is the Moon There When Nobody Looks? A Comment on Zafar Ali Shah v. General Pervez Musharraf’ 102.

[27] Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (1st edn, OUP 2001) 492.

[28] PLD 2009 SC 879, P 167

[29] PLD 2009 SC 879, P 168

[30] SC grants extension to 32 additional judges’ The Express Tribune (Islamabad, 30 August 2010) https://tribune.com.pk/story/44361/judges–appointment–sc–to–resume–hearing–today accessed 29 March 2026.

[31] Syed Shabbar Raza Rizvi, The Judgment, 2009: An Appraisal & Fair Comments on Sindh

High Court Bar Association vs. Federation of Pakistan: (PLD 2009 SC 879) (Key Law Report Publications 2015) 203

[32] Ibid 204